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Bob The Magic Custodian
Summary: Everyone knows that when you give your assets to someone else, they always keep them safe. If this is true for individuals, it is certainly true for businesses. Custodians always tell the truth and manage funds properly. They won't have any interest in taking the assets as an exchange operator would. Auditors tell the truth and can't be misled. That's because organizations that are regulated are incapable of lying and don't make mistakes. First, some background. Here is a summary of how custodians make us more secure: Previously, we might give Alice our crypto assets to hold. There were risks:
Alice might take the assets and disappear.
Alice might spend the assets and pretend that she still has them (fractional model).
Alice might store the assets insecurely and they'll get stolen.
Alice might give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force.
Alice might lose access to the assets.
But "no worries", Alice has a custodian named Bob. Bob is dressed in a nice suit. He knows some politicians. And he drives a Porsche. "So you have nothing to worry about!". And look at all the benefits we get:
Alice can't take the assets and disappear (unless she asks Bob or never gives them to Bob).
Alice can't spend the assets and pretend that she still has them. (Unless she didn't give them to Bob or asks him for them.)
Alice can't store the assets insecurely so they get stolen. (After all - she doesn't have any control over the withdrawal process from any of Bob's systems, right?)
Alice can't give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force. (Bob will stop her, right Bob?)
Alice can't lose access to the funds. (She'll always be present, sane, and remember all secrets, right?)
See - all problems are solved! All we have to worry about now is:
Bob might take the assets and disappear.
Bob might spend the assets and pretend that he still has them (fractional model).
Bob might store the assets insecurely and they'll get stolen.
Bob might give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force.
Bob might lose access to the assets.
It's pretty simple. Before we had to trust Alice. Now we only have to trust Alice, Bob, and all the ways in which they communicate. Just think of how much more secure we are! "On top of that", Bob assures us, "we're using a special wallet structure". Bob shows Alice a diagram. "We've broken the balance up and store it in lots of smaller wallets. That way", he assures her, "a thief can't take it all at once". And he points to a historic case where a large sum was taken "because it was stored in a single wallet... how stupid". "Very early on, we used to have all the crypto in one wallet", he said, "and then one Christmas a hacker came and took it all. We call him the Grinch. Now we individually wrap each crypto and stick it under a binary search tree. The Grinch has never been back since." "As well", Bob continues, "even if someone were to get in, we've got insurance. It covers all thefts and even coercion, collusion, and misplaced keys - only subject to the policy terms and conditions." And with that, he pulls out a phone-book sized contract and slams it on the desk with a thud. "Yep", he continues, "we're paying top dollar for one of the best policies in the country!" "Can I read it?' Alice asks. "Sure," Bob says, "just as soon as our legal team is done with it. They're almost through the first chapter." He pauses, then continues. "And can you believe that sales guy Mike? He has the same year Porsche as me. I mean, what are the odds?" "Do you use multi-sig?", Alice asks. "Absolutely!" Bob replies. "All our engineers are fully trained in multi-sig. Whenever we want to set up a new wallet, we generate 2 separate keys in an air-gapped process and store them in this proprietary system here. Look, it even requires the biometric signature from one of our team members to initiate any withdrawal." He demonstrates by pressing his thumb into the display. "We use a third-party cloud validation API to match the thumbprint and authorize each withdrawal. The keys are also backed up daily to an off-site third-party." "Wow that's really impressive," Alice says, "but what if we need access for a withdrawal outside of office hours?" "Well that's no issue", Bob says, "just send us an email, call, or text message and we always have someone on staff to help out. Just another part of our strong commitment to all our customers!" "What about Proof of Reserve?", Alice asks. "Of course", Bob replies, "though rather than publish any blockchain addresses or signed transaction, for privacy we just do a SHA256 refactoring of the inverse hash modulus for each UTXO nonce and combine the smart contract coefficient consensus in our hyperledger lightning node. But it's really simple to use." He pushes a button and a large green checkmark appears on a screen. "See - the algorithm ran through and reserves are proven." "Wow", Alice says, "you really know your stuff! And that is easy to use! What about fiat balances?" "Yeah, we have an auditor too", Bob replies, "Been using him for a long time so we have quite a strong relationship going! We have special books we give him every year and he's very efficient! Checks the fiat, crypto, and everything all at once!" "We used to have a nice offline multi-sig setup we've been using without issue for the past 5 years, but I think we'll move all our funds over to your facility," Alice says. "Awesome", Bob replies, "Thanks so much! This is perfect timing too - my Porsche got a dent on it this morning. We have the paperwork right over here." "Great!", Alice replies. And with that, Alice gets out her pen and Bob gets the contract. "Don't worry", he says, "you can take your crypto-assets back anytime you like - just subject to our cancellation policy. Our annual management fees are also super low and we don't adjust them often". How many holes have to exist for your funds to get stolen? Just one. Why are we taking a powerful offline multi-sig setup, widely used globally in hundreds of different/lacking regulatory environments with 0 breaches to date, and circumventing it by a demonstrably weak third party layer? And paying a great expense to do so? If you go through the list of breaches in the past 2 years to highly credible organizations, you go through the list of major corporate frauds (only the ones we know about), you go through the list of all the times platforms have lost funds, you go through the list of times and ways that people have lost their crypto from identity theft, hot wallet exploits, extortion, etc... and then you go through this custodian with a fine-tooth comb and truly believe they have value to add far beyond what you could, sticking your funds in a wallet (or set of wallets) they control exclusively is the absolute worst possible way to take advantage of that security. The best way to add security for crypto-assets is to make a stronger multi-sig. With one custodian, what you are doing is giving them your cryptocurrency and hoping they're honest, competent, and flawlessly secure. It's no different than storing it on a really secure exchange. Maybe the insurance will cover you. Didn't work for Bitpay in 2015. Didn't work for Yapizon in 2017. Insurance has never paid a claim in the entire history of cryptocurrency. But maybe you'll get lucky. Maybe your exact scenario will buck the trend and be what they're willing to cover. After the large deductible and hopefully without a long and expensive court battle. And you want to advertise this increase in risk, the lapse of judgement, an accident waiting to happen, as though it's some kind of benefit to customers ("Free institutional-grade storage for your digital assets.")? And then some people are writing to the OSC that custodians should be mandatory for all funds on every exchange platform? That this somehow will make Canadians as a whole more secure or better protected compared with standard air-gapped multi-sig? On what planet? Most of the problems in Canada stemmed from one thing - a lack of transparency. If Canadians had known what a joke Quadriga was - it wouldn't have grown to lose $400m from hard-working Canadians from coast to coast to coast. And Gerald Cotten would be in jail, not wherever he is now (at best, rotting peacefully). EZ-BTC and mister Dave Smilie would have been a tiny little scam to his friends, not a multi-million dollar fraud. Einstein would have got their act together or been shut down BEFORE losing millions and millions more in people's funds generously donated to criminals. MapleChange wouldn't have even been a thing. And maybe we'd know a little more about CoinTradeNewNote - like how much was lost in there. Almost all of the major losses with cryptocurrency exchanges involve deception with unbacked funds. So it's great to see transparency reports from BitBuy and ShakePay where someone independently verified the backing. The only thing we don't have is:
ANY CERTAINTY BALANCES WEREN'T EXCLUDED. Quadriga's largest account was $70m. 80% of funds are in 20% of accounts (Pareto principle). All it takes is excluding a few really large accounts - and nobody's the wiser. A fractional platform can easily pass any audit this way.
ANY VISIBILITY WHATSOEVER INTO THE CUSTODIANS. BitBuy put out their report before moving all the funds to their custodian and ShakePay apparently can't even tell us who the custodian is. That's pretty important considering that basically all of the funds are now stored there.
ANY IDEA ABOUT THE OTHER EXCHANGES. In order for this to be effective, it has to be the norm. It needs to be "unusual" not to know. If obscurity is the norm, then it's super easy for people like Gerald Cotten and Dave Smilie to blend right in.
It's not complicated to validate cryptocurrency assets. They need to exist, they need to be spendable, and they need to cover the total balances. There are plenty of credible people and firms across the country that have the capacity to reasonably perform this validation. Having more frequent checks by different, independent, parties who publish transparent reports is far more valuable than an annual check by a single "more credible/official" party who does the exact same basic checks and may or may not publish anything. Here's an example set of requirements that could be mandated:
First report within 1 month of launching, another within 3 months, and further reports at minimum every 6 months thereafter.
No auditor can be repeated within a 12 month period.
All reports must be public, identifying the auditor and the full methodology used.
All auditors must be independent of the firm being audited with no conflict of interest.
Reports must include the percentage of each asset backed, and how it's backed.
The auditor publishes a hash list, which lists a hash of each customer's information and balances that were included. Hash is one-way encryption so privacy is fully preserved. Every customer can use this to have 100% confidence they were included.
If we want more extensive requirements on audits, these should scale upward based on the total assets at risk on the platform, and whether the platform has loaned their assets out.
There are ways to structure audits such that neither crypto assets nor customer information are ever put at risk, and both can still be properly validated and publicly verifiable. There are also ways to structure audits such that they are completely reasonable for small platforms and don't inhibit innovation in any way. By making the process as reasonable as possible, we can completely eliminate any reason/excuse that an honest platform would have for not being audited. That is arguable far more important than any incremental improvement we might get from mandating "the best of the best" accountants. Right now we have nothing mandated and tons of Canadians using offshore exchanges with no oversight whatsoever. Transparency does not prove crypto assets are safe. CoinTradeNewNote, Flexcoin ($600k), and Canadian Bitcoins ($100k) are examples where crypto-assets were breached from platforms in Canada. All of them were online wallets and used no multi-sig as far as any records show. This is consistent with what we see globally - air-gapped multi-sig wallets have an impeccable record, while other schemes tend to suffer breach after breach. We don't actually know how much CoinTrader lost because there was no visibility. Rather than publishing details of what happened, the co-founder of CoinTrader silently moved on to found another platform - the "most trusted way to buy and sell crypto" - a site that has no information whatsoever (that I could find) on the storage practices and a FAQ advising that “[t]rading cryptocurrency is completely safe” and that having your own wallet is “entirely up to you! You can certainly keep cryptocurrency, or fiat, or both, on the app.” Doesn't sound like much was learned here, which is really sad to see. It's not that complicated or unreasonable to set up a proper hardware wallet. Multi-sig can be learned in a single course. Something the equivalent complexity of a driver's license test could prevent all the cold storage exploits we've seen to date - even globally. Platform operators have a key advantage in detecting and preventing fraud - they know their customers far better than any custodian ever would. The best job that custodians can do is to find high integrity individuals and train them to form even better wallet signatories. Rather than mandating that all platforms expose themselves to arbitrary third party risks, regulations should center around ensuring that all signatories are background-checked, properly trained, and using proper procedures. We also need to make sure that signatories are empowered with rights and responsibilities to reject and report fraud. They need to know that they can safely challenge and delay a transaction - even if it turns out they made a mistake. We need to have an environment where mistakes are brought to the surface and dealt with. Not one where firms and people feel the need to hide what happened. In addition to a knowledge-based test, an auditor can privately interview each signatory to make sure they're not in coercive situations, and we should make sure they can freely and anonymously report any issues without threat of retaliation. A proper multi-sig has each signature held by a separate person and is governed by policies and mutual decisions instead of a hierarchy. It includes at least one redundant signature. For best results, 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7. History has demonstrated over and over again the risk of hot wallets even to highly credible organizations. Nonetheless, many platforms have hot wallets for convenience. While such losses are generally compensated by platforms without issue (for example Poloniex, Bitstamp, Bitfinex, Gatecoin, Coincheck, Bithumb, Zaif, CoinBene, Binance, Bitrue, Bitpoint, Upbit, VinDAX, and now KuCoin), the public tends to focus more on cases that didn't end well. Regardless of what systems are employed, there is always some level of risk. For that reason, most members of the public would prefer to see third party insurance. Rather than trying to convince third party profit-seekers to provide comprehensive insurance and then relying on an expensive and slow legal system to enforce against whatever legal loopholes they manage to find each and every time something goes wrong, insurance could be run through multiple exchange operators and regulators, with the shared interest of having a reputable industry, keeping costs down, and taking care of Canadians. For example, a 4 of 7 multi-sig insurance fund held between 5 independent exchange operators and 2 regulatory bodies. All Canadian exchanges could pay premiums at a set rate based on their needed coverage, with a higher price paid for hot wallet coverage (anything not an air-gapped multi-sig cold wallet). Such a model would be much cheaper to manage, offer better coverage, and be much more reliable to payout when needed. The kind of coverage you could have under this model is unheard of. You could even create something like the CDIC to protect Canadians who get their trading accounts hacked if they can sufficiently prove the loss is legitimate. In cases of fraud, gross negligence, or insolvency, the fund can be used to pay affected users directly (utilizing the last transparent balance report in the worst case), something which private insurance would never touch. While it's recommended to have official policies for coverage, a model where members vote would fully cover edge cases. (Could be similar to the Supreme Court where justices vote based on case law.) Such a model could fully protect all Canadians across all platforms. You can have a fiat coverage governed by legal agreements, and crypto-asset coverage governed by both multi-sig and legal agreements. It could be practical, affordable, and inclusive. Now, we are at a crossroads. We can happily give up our freedom, our innovation, and our money. We can pay hefty expenses to auditors, lawyers, and regulators year after year (and make no mistake - this cost will grow to many millions or even billions as the industry grows - and it will be borne by all Canadians on every platform because platforms are not going to eat up these costs at a loss). We can make it nearly impossible for any new platform to enter the marketplace, forcing Canadians to use the same stagnant platforms year after year. We can centralize and consolidate the entire industry into 2 or 3 big players and have everyone else fail (possibly to heavy losses of users of those platforms). And when a flawed security model doesn't work and gets breached, we can make it even more complicated with even more people in suits making big money doing the job that blockchain was supposed to do in the first place. We can build a system which is so intertwined and dependent on big government, traditional finance, and central bankers that it's future depends entirely on that of the fiat system, of fractional banking, and of government bail-outs. If we choose this path, as history has shown us over and over again, we can not go back, save for revolution. Our children and grandchildren will still be paying the consequences of what we decided today. Or, we can find solutions that work. We can maintain an open and innovative environment while making the adjustments we need to make to fully protect Canadian investors and cryptocurrency users, giving easy and affordable access to cryptocurrency for all Canadians on the platform of their choice, and creating an environment in which entrepreneurs and problem solvers can bring those solutions forward easily. None of the above precludes innovation in any way, or adds any unreasonable cost - and these three policies would demonstrably eliminate or resolve all 109 historic cases as studied here - that's every single case researched so far going back to 2011. It includes every loss that was studied so far not just in Canada but globally as well. Unfortunately, finding answers is the least challenging part. Far more challenging is to get platform operators and regulators to agree on anything. My last post got no response whatsoever, and while the OSC has told me they're happy for industry feedback, I believe my opinion alone is fairly meaningless. This takes the whole community working together to solve. So please let me know your thoughts. Please take the time to upvote and share this with people. Please - let's get this solved and not leave it up to other people to do. Facts/background/sources (skip if you like):
The inspiration for the paragraph about splitting wallets was an actual quote from a Canadian company providing custodial services in response to the OSC consultation paper: "We believe that it will be in the in best interests of investors to prohibit pooled crypto assets or ‘floats’. Most Platforms pool assets, citing reasons of practicality and expense. The recent hack of the world’s largest Platform – Binance – demonstrates the vulnerability of participants’ assets when such concessions are made. In this instance, the Platform’s entire hot wallet of Bitcoins, worth over $40 million, was stolen, facilitated in part by the pooling of client crypto assets." "the maintenance of participants (and Platform) crypto assets across multiple wallets distributes the related risk and responsibility of security - reducing the amount of insurance coverage required and making insurance coverage more readily obtainable". For the record, their reply also said nothing whatsoever about multi-sig or offline storage.
In addition to the fact that the $40m hack represented only one "hot wallet" of Binance, and they actually had the vast majority of assets in other wallets (including mostly cold wallets), multiple real cases have clearly demonstrated that risk is still present with multiple wallets. Bitfinex, VinDAX, Bithumb, Altsbit, BitPoint, Cryptopia, and just recently KuCoin all had multiple wallets breached all at the same time, and may represent a significantly larger impact on customers than the Binance breach which was fully covered by Binance. To represent that simply having multiple separate wallets under the same security scheme is a comprehensive way to reduce risk is just not true.
Private insurance has historically never covered a single loss in the cryptocurrency space (at least, not one that I was able to find), and there are notable cases where massive losses were not covered by insurance. Bitpay in 2015 and Yapizon in 2017 both had insurance policies that didn't pay out during the breach, even after a lengthly court process. The same insurance that ShakePay is presently using (and announced to much fanfare) was describe by their CEO himself as covering “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held,” which is something that has never historically happened. As was said with regard to the same policy in 2018 - “I don’t find it surprising that Lloyd’s is in this space,” said Johnson, adding that to his mind the challenge for everybody is figuring out how to structure these policies so that they are actually protective. “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.”
The most profitable policy for a private insurance company is one with the most expensive premiums that they never have to pay a claim on. They have no inherent incentive to take care of people who lost funds. It's "cheaper" to take the reputational hit and fight the claim in court. The more money at stake, the more the insurance provider is incentivized to avoid payout. They're not going to insure the assets unless they have reasonable certainty to make a profit by doing so, and they're not going to pay out a massive sum unless it's legally forced. Private insurance is always structured to be maximally profitable to the insurance provider.
The circumvention of multi-sig was a key factor in the massive Bitfinex hack of over $60m of bitcoin, which today still sits being slowly used and is worth over $3b. While Bitfinex used a qualified custodian Bitgo, which was and still is active and one of the industry leaders of custodians, and they set up 2 of 3 multi-sig wallets, the entire system was routed through Bitfinex, such that Bitfinex customers could initiate the withdrawals in a "hot" fashion. This feature was also a hit with the hacker. The multi-sig was fully circumvented.
Bitpay in 2015 was another example of a breach that stole 5,000 bitcoins. This happened not through the exploit of any system in Bitpay, but because the CEO of a company they worked with got their computer hacked and the hackers were able to request multiple bitcoin purchases, which Bitpay honoured because they came from the customer's computer legitimately. Impersonation is a very common tactic used by fraudsters, and methods get more extreme all the time.
A notable case in Canada was the Canadian Bitcoins exploit. Funds were stored on a server in a Rogers Data Center, and the attendee was successfully convinced to reboot the server "in safe mode" with a simple phone call, thus bypassing the extensive security and enabling the theft.
The very nature of custodians circumvents multi-sig. This is because custodians are not just having to secure the assets against some sort of physical breach but against any form of social engineering, modification of orders, fraudulent withdrawal attempts, etc... If the security practices of signatories in a multi-sig arrangement are such that the breach risk of one signatory is 1 in 100, the requirement of 3 independent signatures makes the risk of theft 1 in 1,000,000. Since hackers tend to exploit the weakest link, a comparable custodian has to make the entry and exit points of their platform 10,000 times more secure than one of those signatories to provide equivalent protection. And if the signatories beef up their security by only 10x, the risk is now 1 in 1,000,000,000. The custodian has to be 1,000,000 times more secure. The larger and more complex a system is, the more potential vulnerabilities exist in it, and the fewer people can understand how the system works when performing upgrades. Even if a system is completely secure today, one has to also consider how that system might evolve over time or work with different members.
By contrast, offline multi-signature solutions have an extremely solid record, and in the entire history of cryptocurrency exchange incidents which I've studied (listed here), there has only been one incident (796 exchange in 2015) involving an offline multi-signature wallet. It happened because the customer's bitcoin address was modified by hackers, and the amount that was stolen ($230k) was immediately covered by the exchange operators. Basically, the platform operators were tricked into sending a legitimate withdrawal request to the wrong address because hackers exploited their platform to change that address. Such an issue would not be prevented in any way by the use of a custodian, as that custodian has no oversight whatsoever to the exchange platform. It's practical for all exchange operators to test large withdrawal transactions as a general policy, regardless of what model is used, and general best practice is to diagnose and fix such an exploit as soon as it occurs.
False promises on the backing of funds played a huge role in the downfall of Quadriga, and it's been exposed over and over again (MyCoin, PlusToken, Bitsane, Bitmarket, EZBTC, IDAX). Even today, customers have extremely limited certainty on whether their funds in exchanges are actually being backed or how they're being backed. While this issue is not unique to cryptocurrency exchanges, the complexity of the technology and the lack of any regulation or standards makes problems more widespread, and there is no "central bank" to come to the rescue as in the 2008 financial crisis or during the great depression when "9,000 banks failed".
In addition to fraudulent operations, the industry is full of cases where operators have suffered breaches and not reported them. Most recently, Einstein was the largest case in Canada, where ongoing breaches and fraud were perpetrated against the platform for multiple years and nobody found out until the platform collapsed completely. While fraud and breaches suck to deal with, they suck even more when not dealt with. Lack of visibility played a role in the largest downfalls of Mt. Gox, Cryptsy, and Bitgrail. In some cases, platforms are alleged to have suffered a hack and keep operating without admitting it at all, such as CoinBene.
It surprises some to learn that a cryptographic solution has already existed since 2013, and gained widespread support in 2014 after Mt. Gox. Proof of Reserves is a full cryptographic proof that allows any customer using an exchange to have complete certainty that their crypto-assets are fully backed by the platform in real-time. This is accomplished by proving that assets exist on the blockchain, are spendable, and fully cover customer deposits. It does not prove safety of assets or backing of fiat assets.
If we didn't care about privacy at all, a platform could publish their wallet addresses, sign a partial transaction, and put the full list of customer information and balances out publicly. Customers can each check that they are on the list, that the balances are accurate, that the total adds up, and that it's backed and spendable on the blockchain. Platforms who exclude any customer take a risk because that customer can easily check and see they were excluded. So together with all customers checking, this forms a full proof of backing of all crypto assets.
However, obviously customers care about their private information being published. Therefore, a hash of the information can be provided instead. Hash is one-way encryption. The hash allows the customer to validate inclusion (by hashing their own known information), while anyone looking at the list of hashes cannot determine the private information of any other user. All other parts of the scheme remain fully intact. A model like this is in use on the exchange CoinFloor in the UK.
A Merkle tree can provide even greater privacy. Instead of a list of balances, the balances are arranged into a binary tree. A customer starts from their node, and works their way to the top of the tree. For example, they know they have 5 BTC, they plus 1 other customer hold 7 BTC, they plus 2-3 other customers hold 17 BTC, etc... until they reach the root where all the BTC are represented. Thus, there is no way to find the balances of other individual customers aside from one unidentified customer in this case.
Proposals such as this had the backing of leaders in the community including Nic Carter, Greg Maxwell, and Zak Wilcox. Substantial and significant effort started back in 2013, with massive popularity in 2014. But what became of that effort? Very little. Exchange operators continue to refuse to give visibility. Despite the fact this information can often be obtained through trivial blockchain analysis, no Canadian platform has ever provided any wallet addresses publicly. As described by the CEO of Newton "For us to implement some kind of realtime Proof of Reserves solution, which I'm not opposed to, it would have to ... Preserve our users' privacy, as well as our own. Some kind of zero-knowledge proof". Kraken describes here in more detail why they haven't implemented such a scheme. According to professor Eli Ben-Sasson, when he spoke with exchanges, none were interested in implementing Proof of Reserves.
And yet, Kraken's places their reasoning on a page called "Proof of Reserves". More recently, both BitBuy and ShakePay have released reports titled "Proof of Reserves and Security Audit". Both reports contain disclaimers against being audits. Both reports trust the customer list provided by the platform, leaving the open possibility that multiple large accounts could have been excluded from the process. Proof of Reserves is a blockchain validation where customers see the wallets on the blockchain. The report from Kraken is 5 years old, but they leave it described as though it was just done a few weeks ago. And look at what they expect customers to do for validation. When firms represent something being "Proof of Reserve" when it's not, this is like a farmer growing fruit with pesticides and selling it in a farmers market as organic produce - except that these are people's hard-earned life savings at risk here. Platforms are misrepresenting the level of visibility in place and deceiving the public by their misuse of this term. They haven't proven anything.
Fraud isn't a problem that is unique to cryptocurrency. Fraud happens all the time. Enron, WorldCom, Nortel, Bear Stearns, Wells Fargo, Moser Baer, Wirecard, Bre-X, and Nicola are just some of the cases where frauds became large enough to become a big deal (and there are so many countless others). These all happened on 100% reversible assets despite regulations being in place. In many of these cases, the problems happened due to the over-complexity of the financial instruments. For example, Enron had "complex financial statements [which] were confusing to shareholders and analysts", creating "off-balance-sheet vehicles, complex financing structures, and deals so bewildering that few people could understand them". In cryptocurrency, we are often combining complex financial products with complex technologies and verification processes. We are naïve if we think problems like this won't happen. It is awkward and uncomfortable for many people to admit that they don't know how something works. If we want "money of the people" to work, the solutions have to be simple enough that "the people" can understand them, not so confusing that financial professionals and technology experts struggle to use or understand them.
For those who question the extent to which an organization can fool their way into a security consultancy role, HB Gary should be a great example to look at. Prior to trying to out anonymous, HB Gary was being actively hired by multiple US government agencies and others in the private sector (with glowing testimonials). The published articles and hosted professional security conferences. One should also look at this list of data breaches from the past 2 years. Many of them are large corporations, government entities, and technology companies. These are the ones we know about. Undoubtedly, there are many more that we do not know about. If HB Gary hadn't been "outted" by anonymous, would we have known they were insecure? If the same breach had happened outside of the public spotlight, would it even have been reported? Or would HB Gary have just deleted the Twitter posts, brought their site back up, done a couple patches, and kept on operating as though nothing had happened?
In the case of Quadriga, the facts are clear. Despite past experience with platforms such as MapleChange in Canada and others around the world, no guidance or even the most basic of a framework was put in place by regulators. By not clarifying any sort of legal framework, regulators enabled a situation where a platform could be run by former criminal Mike Dhanini/Omar Patryn, and where funds could be held fully unchecked by one person. At the same time, the lack of regulation deterred legitimate entities from running competing platforms and Quadriga was granted a money services business license for multiple years of operation, which gave the firm the appearance of legitimacy. Regulators did little to protect Canadians despite Quadriga failing to file taxes from 2016 onward. The entire administrative team had resigned and this was public knowledge. Many people had suspicions of what was going on, including Ryan Mueller, who forwarded complaints to the authorities. These were ignored, giving Gerald Cotten the opportunity to escape without justice.
There are multiple issues with the SOC II model including the prohibitive cost (you have to find a third party accounting firm and the prices are not even listed publicly on any sites), the requirement of operating for a year (impossible for new platforms), and lack of any public visibility (SOC II are private reports that aren't shared outside the people in suits).
Securities frameworks are expensive. Sarbanes-Oxley is estimated to cost $5.1 million USD/yr for the average Fortune 500 company in the United States. Since "Fortune 500" represents the top 500 companies, that means well over $2.55 billion USD (~$3.4 billion CAD) is going to people in suits. Isn't the problem of trust and verification the exact problem that the blockchain is supposed to solve?
To use Quadriga as justification for why custodians or SOC II or other advanced schemes are needed for platforms is rather silly, when any framework or visibility at all, or even the most basic of storage policies, would have prevented the whole thing. It's just an embarrassment.
We are now seeing regulators take strong action. CoinSquare in Canada with multi-million dollar fines. BitMex from the US, criminal charges and arrests. OkEx, with full disregard of withdrawals and no communication. Who's next?
We have a unique window today where we can solve these problems, and not permanently destroy innovation with unreasonable expectations, but we need to act quickly. This is a unique historic time that will never come again.
How To End The Cryptocurrency Exchange "Wild West" Without Crippling Innovation
In case you haven't noticed the consultation paper, staff notice, and report on Quadriga, regulators are now clamping down on Canadian cryptocurrency exchanges. The OSC and other regulatory bodies are still interested in industry feedback. They have not put forward any official regulation yet. Below are some ideas/insights and a proposed framework.
Typical securities frameworks will cost Canadians millions of dollars (ie Sarbanes-Oxley estimated at $5m USD/yr per firm). Implementation costs of this proposal are significantly cheaper.
Canadians can maintain a diverse set of exchanges, multiple viable business models are still fully supported, and innovation is encouraged while keeping Canadians safe.
Many of you have limited time to read the full proposal, so here are the highlights:
Effective standards to prevent both internal and external theft. Exchange operators are trained and certified, and have a legal responsibility to users.
Regular Transparent Audits
Provides visibility to Canadians that their funds are fully backed on the exchange, while protecting privacy and sensitive platform information.
Establishment of basic insurance standards/strategy, to expand over time. Removing risk to exchange users of any hot wallet theft.
Background and Justifications
Cold Storage Custody/Management After reviewing close to 100 cases, all thefts tend to break down into more or less the same set of problems: • Funds stored online or in a smart contract, • Access controlled by one person or one system, • 51% attacks (rare), • Funds sent to the wrong address (also rare), or • Some combination of the above. For the first two cases, practical solutions exist and are widely implemented on exchanges already. Offline multi-signature solutions are already industry standard. No cases studied found an external theft or exit scam involving an offline multi-signature wallet implementation. Security can be further improved through minimum numbers of signatories, background checks, providing autonomy and legal protections to each signatory, establishing best practices, and a training/certification program. The last two transaction risks occur more rarely, and have never resulted in a loss affecting the actual users of the exchange. In all cases to date where operators made the mistake, they've been fully covered by the exchange platforms. • 51% attacks generally only occur on blockchains with less security. The most prominent cases have been Bitcoin Gold and Ethereum Classic. The simple solution is to enforce deposit limits and block delays such that a 51% attack is not cost-effective. • The risk of transactions to incorrect addresses can be eliminated by a simple test transaction policy on large transactions. By sending a small amount of funds prior to any large withdrawals/transfers as a standard practice, the accuracy of the wallet address can be validated. The proposal covers all loss cases and goes beyond, while avoiding significant additional costs, risks, and limitations which may be associated with other frameworks like SOC II. On The Subject of Third Party Custodians Many Canadian platforms are currently experimenting with third party custody. From the standpoint of the exchange operator, they can liberate themselves from some responsibility of custody, passing that off to someone else. For regulators, it puts crypto in similar categorization to oil, gold, and other commodities, with some common standards. Platform users would likely feel greater confidence if the custodian was a brand they recognized. If the custodian was knowledgeable and had a decent team that employed multi-sig, they could keep assets safe from internal theft. With the right protections in place, this could be a great solution for many exchanges, particularly those that lack the relevant experience or human resources for their own custody systems. However, this system is vulnerable to anyone able to impersonate the exchange operators. You may have a situation where different employees who don't know each other that well are interacting between different companies (both the custodian and all their customers which presumably isn't just one exchange). A case study of what can go wrong in this type of environment might be Bitpay, where the CEO was tricked out of 5000 bitcoins over 3 separate payments by a series of emails sent legitimately from a breached computer of another company CEO. It's also still vulnerable to the platform being compromised, as in the really large $70M Bitfinex hack, where the third party Bitgo held one key in a multi-sig wallet. The hacker simply authorized the withdrawal using the same credentials as Bitfinex (requesting Bitgo to sign multiple withdrawal transactions). This succeeded even with the use of multi-sig and two heavily security-focused companies, due to the lack of human oversight (basically, hot wallet). Of course, you can learn from these cases and improve the security, but so can hackers improve their deception and at the end of the day, both of these would have been stopped by the much simpler solution of a qualified team who knew each other and employed multi-sig with properly protected keys. It's pretty hard to beat a human being who knows the business and the typical customer behaviour (or even knows their customers personally) at spotting fraud, and the proposed multi-sig means any hacker has to get through the scrutiny of 3 (or more) separate people, all of whom would have proper training including historical case studies. There are strong arguments both for and against using use of third party custodians. The proposal sets mandatory minimum custody standards would apply regardless if the cold wallet signatories are exchange operators, independent custodians, or a mix of both. On The Subject Of Insurance ShakePay has taken the first steps into this new realm (congratulations). There is no question that crypto users could be better protected by the right insurance policies, and it certainly feels better to transact with insured platforms. The steps required to obtain insurance generally place attention in valuable security areas, and in this case included a review from CipherTrace. One of the key solutions in traditional finance comes from insurance from entities such as the CDIC. However, historically, there wasn't found any actual insurance payout to any cryptocurrency exchange, and there are notable cases where insurance has not paid. With Bitpay, for example, the insurance agent refused because the issue happened to the third party CEO's computer instead of anything to do with Bitpay itself. With the Youbit exchange in South Korea, their insurance claim was denied, and the exchange ultimately ended up instead going bankrupt with all user's funds lost. To quote Matt Johnson in the original Lloyd's article: “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.” ShakePay's insurance was only reported to cover their cold storage, and “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held”. Physical theft has never, in the history of cryptocurrency exchange cases reviewed, been reported as the cause of loss. From the limited information of the article, ShakePay made it clear their funds are in the hands of a single US custodian, and at least part of their security strategy is to "decline to confirm the custodian’s name on the record". While this prevents scrutiny of the custodian, it's pretty silly to speculate that a reasonably competent hacking group couldn't determine who the custodian is. A far more common infiltration strategy historically would be social engineering, which has succeeded repeatedly. A hacker could trick their way into ShakePay's systems and request a fraudulent withdrawal, impersonate ShakePay and request the custodian to move funds, or socially engineer their way into the custodian to initiate the withdrawal of multiple accounts (a payout much larger than ShakePay) exploiting the standard procedures (for example, fraudulently initiating or override the wallet addresses of a real transfer). In each case, nothing was physically stolen and the loss is therefore not covered by insurance. In order for any insurance to be effective, clear policies have to be established about what needs to be covered. Anything short of that gives Canadians false confidence that they are protected when they aren't in any meaningful way. At this time, the third party insurance market does not appear to provide adequate options or coverage, and effort is necessary to standardize custody standards, which is a likely first step in ultimately setting up an insurance framework. A better solution compared to third party insurance providers might be for Canadian exchange operators to create their own collective insurance fund, or a specific federal organization similar to the CDIC. Such an organization would have a greater interest or obligation in paying out actual cases, and that would be it's purpose rather than maximizing it's own profit. This would be similar to the SAFU which Binance has launched, except it would cover multiple exchanges. There is little question whether the SAFU would pay out given a breach of Binance, and a similar argument could be made for a insurance fund managed by a collective of exchange operators or a government organization. While a third party insurance provider has the strong market incentive to provide the absolute minimum coverage and no market incentive to payout, an entity managed by exchange operators would have incentive to protect the reputation of exchange operators/the industry, and the government should have the interest of protecting Canadians. On The Subject of Fractional Reserve There is a long history of fractional reserve failures, from the first banks in ancient times, through the great depression (where hundreds of fractional reserve banks failed), right through to the 2008 banking collapse referenced in the first bitcoin block. The fractional reserve system allows banks to multiply the money supply far beyond the actual cash (or other assets) in existence, backed only by a system of debt obligations of others. Safely supporting a fractional reserve system is a topic of far greater complexity than can be addressed by a simple policy, and when it comes to cryptocurrency, there is presently no entity reasonably able to bail anyone out in the event of failure. Therefore, this framework is addressed around entities that aim to maintain 100% backing of funds. There may be some firms that desire but have failed to maintain 100% backing. In this case, there are multiple solutions, including outside investment, merging with other exchanges, or enforcing a gradual restoration plan. All of these solutions are typically far better than shutting down the exchange, and there are multiple cases where they've been used successfully in the past. Proof of Reserves/Transparency/Accountability Canadians need to have visibility into the backing on an ongoing basis. The best solution for crypto-assets is a Proof of Reserve. Such ideas go back all the way to 2013, before even Mt. Gox. However, no Canadian exchange has yet implemented such a system, and only a few international exchanges (CoinFloor in the UK being an example) have. Many firms like Kraken, BitBuy, and now ShakePay use the Proof of Reserve term to refer to lesser proofs which do not actually cryptographically prove the full backing of all user assets on the blockchain. In order for a Proof of Reserve to be effective, it must actually be a complete proof, and it needs to be understood by the public that is expected to use it. Many firms have expressed reservations about the level of transparency required in a complete Proof of Reserve (for example Kraken here). While a complete Proof of Reserves should be encouraged, and there are some solutions in the works (ie TxQuick), this is unlikely to be suitable universally for all exchange operators and users. Given the limitations, and that firms also manage fiat assets, a more traditional audit process makes more sense. Some Canadian exchanges (CoinSquare, CoinBerry) have already subjected themselves to annual audits. However, these results are not presently shared publicly, and there is no guarantee over the process including all user assets or the integrity and independence of the auditor. The auditor has been typically not known, and in some cases, the identity of the auditor is protected by a NDA. Only in one case (BitBuy) was an actual report generated and publicly shared. There has been no attempt made to validate that user accounts provided during these audits have been complete or accurate. A fraudulent fractional exchange, or one which had suffered a breach they were unwilling to publicly accept (see CoinBene), could easily maintain a second set of books for auditors or simply exclude key accounts to pass an individual audit. The proposed solution would see a reporting standard which includes at a minimum - percentage of backing for each asset relative to account balances and the nature of how those assets are stored, with ownership proven by the auditor. The auditor would also publicly provide a "hash list", which they independently generate from the accounts provided by the exchange. Every exchange user can then check their information against this public "hash list". A hash is a one-way form of encryption, which fully protects the private information, yet allows anyone who knows that information already to validate that it was included. Less experienced users can take advantage of public tools to calculate the hash from their information (provided by the exchange), and thus have certainty that the auditor received their full balance information. Easy instructions can be provided. Auditors should be impartial, their identities and process public, and they should be rotated so that the same auditor is never used twice in a row. Balancing the cost of auditing against the needs for regular updates, a 6 month cycle likely makes the most sense. Hot Wallet Management The best solution for hot wallets is not to use them. CoinBerry reportedly uses multi-sig on all withdrawals, and Bitmex is an international example known for their structure devoid of hot wallets. However, many platforms and customers desire fast withdrawal processes, and human validation has a cost of time and delay in this process. A model of self-insurance or separate funds for hot wallets may be used in these cases. Under this model, a platform still has 100% of their client balance in cold storage and holds additional funds in hot wallets for quick withdrawal. Thus, the risk of those hot wallets is 100% on exchange operators and not affecting the exchange users. Since most platforms typically only have 1%-5% in hot wallets at any given time, it shouldn't be unreasonable to build/maintain these additional reserves over time using exchange fees or additional investment. Larger withdrawals would still be handled at regular intervals from the cold storage. Hot wallet risks have historically posed a large risk and there is no established standard to guarantee secure hot wallets. When the government of South Korea dispatched security inspections to multiple exchanges, the results were still that 3 of them got hacked after the inspections. If standards develop such that an organization in the market is willing to insure the hot wallets, this could provide an acceptable alternative. Another option may be for multiple exchange operators to pool funds aside for a hot wallet insurance fund. Comprehensive coverage standards must be established and maintained for all hot wallet balances to make sure Canadians are adequately protected.
Current Draft Proposal
(1) Proper multi-signature cold wallet storage. (a) Each private key is the personal and legal responsibility of one person - the “signatory”. Signatories have special rights and responsibilities to protect user assets. Signatories are trained and certified through a course covering (1) past hacking and fraud cases, (2) proper and secure key generation, and (3) proper safekeeping of private keys. All private keys must be generated and stored 100% offline by the signatory. If even one private keys is ever breached or suspected to be breached, the wallet must be regenerated and all funds relocated to a new wallet. (b) All signatories must be separate background-checked individuals free of past criminal conviction. Canadians should have a right to know who holds their funds. All signing of transactions must take place with all signatories on Canadian soil or on the soil of a country with a solid legal system which agrees to uphold and support these rules (from an established white-list of countries which expands over time). (c) 3-5 independent signatures are required for any withdrawal. There must be 1-3 spare signatories, and a maximum of 7 total signatories. The following are all valid combinations: 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7. (d) A security audit should be conducted to validate the cold wallet is set up correctly and provide any additional pertinent information. The primary purpose is to ensure that all signatories are acting independently and using best practices for private key storage. A report summarizing all steps taken and who did the audit will be made public. Canadians must be able to validate the right measures are in place to protect their funds. (e) There is a simple approval process if signatories wish to visit any country outside Canada, with a potential whitelist of exempt countries. At most 2 signatories can be outside of aligned jurisdiction at any given time. All exchanges would be required to keep a compliant cold wallet for Canadian funds and have a Canadian office if they wish to serve Canadian customers. (2) Regular and transparent solvency audits. (a) An audit must be conducted at founding, after 3 months of operation, and at least once every 6 months to compare customer balances against all stored cryptocurrency and fiat balances. The auditor must be known, independent, and never the same twice in a row. (b) An audit report will be published featuring the steps conducted in a readable format. This should be made available to all Canadians on the exchange website and on a government website. The report must include what percentage of each customer asset is backed on the exchange, and how those funds are stored. (c) The auditor will independently produce a hash of each customer's identifying information and balance as they perform the audit. This will be made publicly available on the exchange and government website, along with simplified instructions that each customer can use to verify that their balance was included in the audit process. (d) The audit needs to include a proof of ownership for any cryptocurrency wallets included. A satoshi test (spending a small amount) or partially signed transaction both qualify. (e) Any platform without 100% reserves should be assessed on a regular basis by a government or industry watchdog. This entity should work to prevent any further drop, support any private investor to come in, or facilitate a merger so that 100% backing can be obtained as soon as possible. (3) Protections for hot wallets and transactions. (a) A standardized list of approved coins and procedures will be established to constitute valid cold storage wallets. Where a multi-sig process is not natively available, efforts will be undertaken to establish a suitable and stable smart contract standard. This list will be expanded and improved over time. Coins and procedures not on the list are considered hot wallets. (b) Hot wallets can be backed by additional funds in cold storage or an acceptable third-party insurance provider with a comprehensive coverage policy. (c) Exchanges are required to cover the full balance of all user funds as denominated in the same currency, or double the balance as denominated in bitcoin or CAD using an established trading rate. If the balance is ever insufficient due to market movements, the firm must rectify this within 24 hours by moving assets to cold storage or increasing insurance coverage. (d) Any large transactions (above a set threshold) from cold storage to any new wallet addresses (not previously transacted with) must be tested with a smaller transaction first. Deposits of cryptocurrency must be limited to prevent economic 51% attacks. Any issues are to be covered by the exchange. (e) Exchange platforms must provide suitable authentication for users, including making available approved forms of two-factor authentication. SMS-based authentication is not to be supported. Withdrawals must be blocked for 48 hours in the event of any account password change. Disputes on the negligence of exchanges should be governed by case law.
Continued review of existing OSC feedback is still underway. More feedback and opinions on the framework and ideas as presented here are extremely valuable. The above is a draft and not finalized. The process of further developing and bringing a suitable framework to protect Canadians will require the support of exchange operators, legal experts, and many others in the community. The costs of not doing such are tremendous. A large and convoluted framework, one based on flawed ideas or implementation, or one which fails to properly safeguard Canadians is not just extremely expensive and risky for all Canadians, severely limiting to the credibility and reputation of the industry, but an existential risk to many exchanges. The responsibility falls to all of us to provide our insight and make our opinions heard on this critical matter. Please take the time to give your thoughts.
Ferrum Network Community Update — December 8, 2019
Dear Community, What an exciting and jammed pack few weeks it has been — with the launch of staking, the 2Key Network partnership, and a major Kudi update — to name a few! But as the profile of Ferrum continues to grow, it is essential we never stray from the fundamentals that got us this far: hard work, transparency, and a commitment to community. In this community update, we provide a recap of the last few weeks, and look ahead to a few initiatives we are planning. Business Update With the release of the FRM Flexible Staking platform, we took that opportunity to kick the marketing into high gear. These marketing efforts paid off, and we were fortunate to be picked up by top influencers like Teh Moonwalker, Oddgems, and Micro Cap Gems. Here’s what happened the past few weeks.
Released FRM Staking version 0.1 with the 18 month staking pool selling out in about 15 minutes. The total amount of FRM locked for staking is 8,412,666 + 2,397,260 locked for rewards, which equate to around 10% of FRM circulating supply.
Conducted no less than 10 AMAs in the past 4 weeks in major channels like Moonwalker’s, the AMA Room and CryptoCabital, among many others.
Announced a partnership with 2Key Network to utilize their Smart Links technology so our community can be rewarded for referring Ferrum Network products.
We’ve also seen strong growth of the Social Mining platform, with over 50 members now actively participating in the community created Social Mining Chat, and no less than 3,083 members signed up for social mining.
Tech Update For those who missed the Tech Update from our CEO Naiem Yeganeh, PhD, here are some highlights:
Backend. we have made major progress in the backend which is enabling us to launch products faster and cheaper, such as building abstraction layers around security and chain access to speed up the development process
Coding. The dev team have been working on more than 25 repositories and has averaged around 1.5 commits per day, including weekends.
Products. In the past 3 months we have built several products including KYC collection, management tools, and the Token Bridge. Last product is our staking platform built on top of Ethereum network, which is a flexible staking system for ERC20 tokens and a MetaMask integrated UI.
First Kudi. Significant progress in improving, refactoring, and adding features including one-click bank accounts, POS improvements, automatic invoicing, and more.
Unifyre Wallet: Backend is mostly complete, and we are working very hard to make it ready for Beta testers by end of year. Unifyre will be a unique multi-chain crypto wallet. It will be the first wallet where you completely take control of your private keys, but can benefit from server side security checks such as two factor authentication, AI based fraud detection, geo-fencing, locking account on a lost or stolen phone, and other security features. You will have access to buy crypto around the world and will work seamlessly with other Ferrum products.
Network and other products: Most work on Unifyre and Kudi are architectured in such a way to optimize code re-usability. We are making progress toward some other products and the mainnet, which will be announced accordingly.
First Kudi Update The First Kudi team on the ground in Nigeria continues to make significant progress.
Announced the new First Kudi website along with the upcoming initiative with the Kudi Bank card
Added a major feature to the app which gives all our users their own personal bank account through our partnership with Providus Bank!
Our Referral Program has seen major growth, with nearly 100 users being referred in the past few weeks and growing daily!
Apple iOS has been preliminarily approved! However, Apple is requesting certain accommodations so the app works on the iPad, which may require more development work. We appreciate your patience.
We released an early version of a video showing merchants using the app. More videos will be released soon.
What’s Next It is critical we capitalize on the attention we have garnered from the team and community efforts, and to start 2020 with a bang. Here are some of the upcoming initiatives we are working on. Flexible ERC-20 Staking v0.2 We are strongly considering launching another round of staking. We are taking the lessons learned from the first round and improving the experience. Community feedback will be key to make version two even better, so expect to see a series of polls in the coming days. A Trading Community A strong group of FRM traders who post technical analysis on social media is great for exposure and great for liquidity. We are currently laying the groundwork to build a trading community to come up with initiatives like trading competitions and special trading rewards. Anyone interested in joining such a community should PM Ian on Telegram. FRM on Kudi We have been working hard to add FRM and ETH to the Kudi app so our users can buy it directly with Naira. This will also open up additional utilities for the FRM token, including a premium membership program that will reward users for holding the token and using the app. More details to follow. Expansion into other Markets As you may know, one part of our business model is to partner with top notch teams in emerging markets where our fiat gateway + payments app technology can be successful. We are happy to report that we have started to work with such a team in Brazil and they are in the early stages of launching their own product powered by Ferrum Network. More news to follow. Conclusion Thank you all for your continued support of Ferrum Network. 2019 was a really special year that we will never forget. But together we can make 2020 even better! Very truly yours, The Ferrum Network Team Ferrum Network Links: Website: https://ferrum.network/ Telegram: http://telegram.ferrum.network Twitter: http://twitter.ferrum.network LinkedIn: http://linkedin.ferrum.network YouTube: http://youtube.ferrum.network Reddit: http://reddit.ferrum.network Bitcoin Talk: http://bitcointalk.ferrum.network Facebook: http://facebook.ferrum.network Github: https://github.com/ferrumnet/ Instagram: http://instagram.ferrum.network
A couple of years ago in the early months of the 2017, I published a piece called Abundance Via Cryptocurrencies (https://www.reddit.com/C\_S\_T/comments/69d12a/abundance\_via\_cryptocurrencies/) in which I kind of foresaw the crypto boom that had bitcoin go from $1k to $21k and the alt-coin economy swell up to have more than 60% of the bitcoin market capitalisation. At the time, I spoke of coming out from “the Pit” of conspiracy research and that I was a bit suss on bitcoin’s inception story. At the time I really didn’t see the scaling solution being put forward as being satisfactory and the progress on bitcoin seemed stifled by the politics of the social consensus on an open source protocol so I was looking into alt coins that I thought could perhaps improve upon the shortcomings of bitcoin. In the thread I made someone recommended to have a look at 4chan’s business and finance board. I did end up taking a look at it just as the bull market started to really surge. I found myself in a sea of anonymous posters who threw out all kinds of info and memes about the hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands of different shitcoins and why they’re all going to have lambos on the moon. I got right in to it, I loved the idea of filtering through all the shitposts and finding the nuggest of truth amongst it all and was deeply immersed in it all as the price of bitcoin surged 20x and alt coins surged 5-10 times against bitcoin themselves. This meant there were many people who chucked in a few grand and bought a stash of alt coins that they thought were gonna be the next big thing and some people ended up with “portfolios” 100-1000x times their initial investment. To explain what it’s like to be on an anonymous business and finance board populated with incel neets, nazis, capitalist shit posters, autistic geniuses and whoever the hell else was using the board for shilling their coins during a 100x run up is impossible. It’s hilarious, dark, absurd, exciting and ultimately addictive as fuck. You have this app called blockfolio that you check every couple of minutes to see the little green percentages and the neat graphs of your value in dollars or bitcoin over day, week, month or year. Despite my years in the pit researching conspiracy, and my being suss on bitcoin in general I wasn’t anywhere near as distrustful as I should have been of an anonymous business and finance board and although I do genuinely think there are good people out there who are sharing information with one another in good faith and feel very grateful to the anons that have taken their time to write up quality content to educate people they don’t know, I wasn’t really prepared for the level of organisation and sophistication of the efforts groups would go to to deceive in this space. Over the course of my time in there I watched my portfolio grow to ridiculous numbers relative to what I put in but I could never really bring myself to sell at the top of a pump as I always felt I had done my research on a coin and wanted to hold it for a long time so why would I sell? After some time though I would read about something new or I would find out of dodgy relationships of a coin I had and would want to exit my position and then I would rebalance my portfolio in to a coin I thought was either technologically superior or didn’t have the nefarious connections to people I had come across doing conspiracy research. Because I had been right in to the conspiracy and the decentralisation tropes I guess I always carried a bit of an antiauthoritarian/anarchist bias and despite participating in a ridiculously capitalistic market, was kind of against capitalism and looking to a blockchain protocol to support something along the lines of an open source anarchosyndicalist cryptocommune. I told myself I was investing in the tech and believed in the collective endeavour of the open source project and ultimately had faith some mysterious “they” would develop a protocol that would emancipate us from this debt slavery complex. As I became more and more aware of how to spot artificial discussion on the chans, I began to seek out further some of the radical projects like vtorrent and skycoin and I guess became a bit carried away from being amidst such ridiculous overt shilling as on the boards so that if you look in my post history you can even see me promoting some of these coins to communities I thought might be sympathetic to their use case. I didn’t see it at the time because I always thought I was holding the coins with the best tech and wanted to ride them up as an investor who believed in them, but this kind of promotion is ultimately just part of a mentality that’s pervasive to the cryptocurrency “community” that insists because it is a decentralised project you have to in a way volunteer to inform people about the coin since the more decentralised ones without premines or DAO structures don’t have marketing budgets, or don’t have marketing teams. In the guise of cultivating a community, groups form together on social media platforms like slack, discord, telegram, twitter and ‘vote’ for different proposals, donate funds to various boards/foundations that are set up to give a “roadmap” for the coins path to greatness and organise marketing efforts on places like reddit, the chans, twitter. That’s for the more grass roots ones at least, there are many that were started as a fork of another coin, or a ICO, airdrop or all these different ways of disseminating a new cryptocurrency or raising funding for promising to develop one. Imagine the operations that can be run by a team that raised millions, hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars on their ICOs, especially if they are working in conjunction with a new niche of cryptocurrency media that’s all nepotistic and incestuous. About a year and a half ago I published another piece called “Bitcoin is about to be dethroned” (https://www.reddit.com/C\_S\_T/comments/7ewmuu/bitcoin\_is\_about\_to\_be\_dethroned/) where I felt I had come to realise the scaling debate had been corrupted by a company called Blockstream and they had been paying for social media operations in a fashion not to dissimilar to correct the record or such to control the narrative around the scaling debate and then through deceit and manipulation curated an apparent consensus around their narrative and hijacked the bitcoin name and ticker (BTC). I read the post again just before posting this and decided to refer to it to to add some kind of continuity to my story and hopefully save me writing so much out. Looking back on something you wrote is always a bit cringey especially because I can see that although I had made it a premise post, I was acting pretty confident that I was right and my tongue was acidic because of so much combating of shills on /biz/ but despite the fact I was wrong about the timing I stand by much of what I wrote then and want to expand upon it a bit more now. The fork of the bitcoin protocol in to bitcoin core (BTC) and bitcoin cash (BCH) is the biggest value fork of the many that have occurred. There were a few others that forked off from the core chain that haven’t had any kind of attention put on them, positive or negative and I guess just keep chugging away as their own implementation. The bitcoin cash chain was supposed to be the camp that backed on chain scaling in the debate, but it turned out not everyone was entirely on board with that and some players/hashpower felt it was better to do a layer two type solution themselves although with bigger blocks servicing the second layer. Throughout what was now emerging as a debate within the BCH camp, Craig Wright and Calvin Ayre of Coin Geek said they were going to support massive on chain scaling, do a node implementation that would aim to restore bitcoin back to the 0.1.0 release which had all kinds of functionality included in it that had later been stripped by Core developers over the years and plan to bankrupt the people from Core who changed their mind on agreeing with on-chain scaling. This lead to a fork off the BCH chain in to bitcoin satoshis vision (BSV) and bitcoin cash ABC. https://bitstagram.bitdb.network/m/raw/cbb50c322a2a89f3c627e1680a3f40d4ad3cee5a3fb153e5d6d001bdf85de404 The premise for this post is that Craig S Wright was Satoshi Nakamoto. It’s an interesting premise because depending upon your frame of reference the premise may either be a fact or to some too outrageous to even believe as a premise. Yesterday it was announced via CoinGeek that Craig Steven Wright has been granted the copyright claim for both the bitcoin white-paper under the pen name Satoshi Nakamoto and the original 0.1.0 bitcoin software (both of which were marked (c) copyright of satoshi nakamoto. The reactions to the news can kind of be classified in to four different reactions. Those who heard it and rejected it, those who heard it but remained undecided, those who heard it and accepted it, and those who already believed he was. Apparently to many the price was unexpected and such a revelation wasn’t exactly priced in to the market with the price immediately pumping nearly 100% upon the news breaking. However, to some others it was a vindication of something they already believed. This is an interesting phenomena to observe. For many years now I have always occupied a somewhat positively contrarian position to the default narrative put forward to things so it’s not entirely surprising that I find myself in a camp that holds the minority opinion. As you can see in the bitcoin dethroned piece I called Craig fake satoshi, but over the last year and bit I investigated the story around Craig and came to my conclusion that I believed him to be at least a major part of a team of people who worked on the protocol I have to admit that through reading his articles, I have kind of been brought full circle to where my contrarian opinion has me becoming somewhat of an advocate for “the system’. https://coingeek.com/bitcoin-creator-craig-s-wright-satoshi-nakamoto-granted-us-copyright-registrations-for-bitcoin-white-paper-and-code/ When the news dropped, many took to social media to see what everyone was saying about it. On /biz/ a barrage of threads popped up discussing it with many celebrating and many rejecting the significance of such a copyright claim being granted. Immediately in nearly every thread there was a posting of an image of a person from twitter claiming that registering for copyright is an easy process that’s granted automatically unless challenged and so it doesn’t mean anything. This was enough for many to convince them of the insignificance of the revelation because of the comment from a person who claimed to have authority on twitter. Others chimed in to add that in fact there was a review of the copyright registration especially in high profile instances and these reviewers were satisfied with the evidence provided by Craig for the claim. At the moment Craig is being sued by Ira Kleiman for an amount of bitcoin that he believes he is entitled to because of Craig and Ira’s brother Dave working together on bitcoin. He is also engaged in suing a number of people from the cryptocurrency community for libel and defamation after they continued to use their social media/influencer positions to call him a fraud and a liar. He also has a number of patents lodged through his company nChain that are related to blockchain technologies. This has many people up in arms because in their mind Satoshi was part of a cypherpunk movement, wanted anonymity, endorsed what they believed to be an anti state and open source technologies and would use cryptography rather than court to prove his identity and would have no interest in patents. https://bitstagram.bitdb.network/m/raw/1fce34a7004759f8db16b2ae9678e9c6db434ff2e399f59b5a537f72eff2c1a1 https://imgur.com/a/aANAsL3) If you listen to Craig with an open mind, what cannot be denied is the man is bloody smart. Whether he is honest or not is up to you to decide, but personally I try to give everyone the benefit of the doubt and then cut them off if i find them to be dishonest. What I haven’t really been able to do with my investigation of craig is cut him off. There have been many moments where I disagree with what he has had to say but I don’t think people having an opinion about something that I believe to be incorrect is the same as being a dishonest person. It’s very important to distinguish the two and if you are unable to do so there is a very real risk of you projecting expectations or ideals upon someone based off your ideas of who they are. Many times if someone is telling the truth but you don’t understand it, instead of acknowledging you don’t understand it, you label them as being stupid or dishonest. I think that has happened to an extreme extent with Craig. Let’s take for example the moment when someone in the slack channel asked Craig if he had had his IQ tested and what it was. Craig replied with 179. The vast majority of people on the internet have heard someone quote their IQ before in an argument or the IQ of others and to hear someone say such a score that is actually 6 standard deviations away from the mean score (so probably something like 1/100 000) immediately makes them reject it on the grounds of probability. Craig admits that he’s not the best with people and having worked with/taught many high functioning people (sometimes on the spectrum perhaps) on complex anatomical and physiological systems I have seen some that also share the same difficulties in relating to people and reconciling their genius and understandings with more average intelligences. Before rejecting his claim outright because we don’t understand much of what he says, it would be prudent to first check is there any evidence that may lend support to his claim of a one in a million intelligence quotient. Craig has mentioned on a number of occasions that he holds a number of different degrees and certifications in relation to law, cryptography, statistics, mathematics, economics, theology, computer science, information technology/security. I guess that does sound like something someone with an extremely high intelligence could achieve. Now I haven’t validated all of them but from a simple check on Charles Sturt’s alumni portal using his birthday of 23rd of October 1970 we can see that he does in fact have 3 Masters and a PhD from Charles Sturt. Other pictures I have seen from his office at nChain have degrees in frames on the wall and a developer published a video titled Craig Wright is a Genius with 17 degrees where he went and validated at least 8 of them I believe. He is recently publishing his Doctorate of Theology through an on-chain social media page that you have to pay a little bit for access to sections of his thesis. It’s titled the gnarled roots of creation. He has also mentioned on a number of occasions his vast industry experience as both a security contractor and business owner. An archive from his LinkedIn can be seen below as well. LinkedIn - https://archive.is/Q66Gl https://youtu.be/nXdkczX5mR0 - Craig Wright is a Genius with 17 Degrees https://www.yours.org/content/gnarled-roots-of-a-creation-mythos-45e69558fae0 - Gnarled Roots of Creation. In fact here is an on chain collection of articles and videos relating to Craig called the library of craig - https://www.bitpaste.app/tx/94b361b205196560d1bd09e4e3b3ec7ad6bea478af204cabfe243efd8fc944dd So there is a guy with 17 degrees, a self professed one in a hundred thousand IQ, who’s worked for Australian Federal Police, ASIO, NSA, NASA, ASX. He’s been in Royal Australian Air Force, operated a number of businesses in Australia, published half a dozen academic papers on networks, cryptography, security, taught machine learning and digital forensics at a number of universities and then another few hundred short articles on medium about his work in these various domains, has filed allegedly 700 patents on blockchain related technology that he is going to release on bitcoin sv, copyrighted the name so that he may prevent other competing protocols from using the brand name, that is telling you he is the guy that invented the technology that he has a whole host of other circumstantial evidence to support that, but people won’t believe that because they saw something that a talking head on twitter posted or that a Core Developer said, or a random document that appears online with a C S Wright signature on it that lists access to an address that is actually related to Roger Ver, that’s enough to write him off as a scam. Even then when he publishes a photo of the paper copy which appears to supersede the scanned one, people still don’t readjust their positions on the matter and resort back to “all he has to do is move the coins or sign a tx”. https://imgur.com/urJbe10 Yes Craig was on the Cypherpunk mailing list back in the day, but that doesn’t mean that he was or is an anarchist. Or that he shares the same ideas that Code Is Law that many from the crypto community like to espouse. I myself have definitely been someone to parrot the phrase myself before reading lots of Craig’s articles and trying to understand where he is coming from. What I have come to learn from listening and reading the man, is that although I might be fed up with the systems we have in place, they still exist to perform important functions within society and because of that the tools we develop to serve us have to exist within that preexisting legal and social framework in order for them to have any chance at achieving global success in replacing fiat money with the first mathematically provably scarce commodity. He says he designed bitcoin to be an immutable data ledger where everyone is forced to be honest, and economically disincentivised to perform attacks within the network because of the logs kept in a Write Once Read Many (WORM) ledger with hierarchical cryptographic keys. In doing so you eliminate 99% of cyber crime, create transparent DAO type organisations that can be audited and fully compliant with legislature that’s developed by policy that comes from direct democratic voting software. Everyone who wants anonymous coins wants to have them so they can do dishonest things, illegal things, buy drugs, launder money, avoid taxes. Now this triggers me a fair bit as someone who has bought drugs online, who probably hasn’t paid enough tax, who has done illegal things contemplating what it means to have that kind of an evidence ledger, and contemplate a reality where there are anonymous cryptocurrencies, where massive corporations continue to be able to avoid taxes, or where methamphetamine can be sold by the tonne, or where people can be bought and sold. This is the reality of creating technologies that can enable and empower criminals. I know some criminals and regard them as very good friends, but I know there are some criminals that I do not wish to know at all. I know there are people that do horrific things in the world and I know that something that makes it easier for them is having access to funds or the ability to move money around without being detected. I know arms, drugs and people are some of the biggest markets in the world, I know there is more than $50 trillion dollars siphoned in to off shore tax havens from the value generated as the product of human creativity in the economy and how much human charity is squandered through the NGO apparatus. I could go on and on about the crappy things happening in the world but I can also imagine them getting a lot worse with an anonymous cryptocurrency. Not to say that I don’t think there shouldn’t be an anonymous cryptocurrency. If someone makes one that works, they make one that works. Maybe they get to exist for a little while as a honeypot or if they can operate outside the law successfully longer, but bitcoin itself shouldn’t be one. There should be something a level playing field for honest people to interact with sound money. And if they operate within the law, then they will have more than adequate privacy, just they will leave immutable evidence for every transaction that can be used as evidence to build a case against you committing a crime. His claim is that all the people that are protesting the loudest about him being Satoshi are all the people that are engaged in dishonest business or that have a vested interest in there not being one singular global ledger but rather a whole myriad of alternative currencies that can be pumped and dumped against one another, have all kinds of financial instruments applied to them like futures and then have these exchanges and custodial services not doing any Know Your Customer (KYC) or Anti Money Laundering (AML) processes. Bitcoin SV was delisted by a number of exchanges recently after Craig launched legal action at some twitter crypto influencetalking heads who had continued to call him a fraud and then didn’t back down when the CEO of one of the biggest crypto exchanges told him to drop the case or he would delist his coin. The trolls of twitter all chimed in in support of those who have now been served with papers for defamation and libel and Craig even put out a bitcoin reward for a DOX on one of the people who had been particularly abusive to him on twitter. A big european exchange then conducted a twitter poll to determine whether or not BSV should be delisted as either (yes, it’s toxic or no) and when a few hundred votes were in favour of delisting it (which can be bought for a couple of bucks/100 votes). Shortly after Craig was delisted, news began to break of a US dollar stable coin called USDT potentially not being fully solvent for it’s apparent 1:1 backing of the token to dollars in the bank. Binance suffered an alleged exchange hack with 7000 BTC “stolen” and the site suspending withdrawals and deposits for a week. Binance holds 800m USDT for their US dollar markets and immediately once the deposits and withdrawals were suspended there was a massive pump for BTC in the USDT markets as people sought to exit their potentially not 1:1 backed token for bitcoin. The CEO of this exchange has the business registered out of Malta, no physical premises, the CEO stays hotel room to hotel room around the world, has all kind of trading competitions and the binance launchpad, uses an unregistered security to collect fees ($450m during the bear market) from the trading of the hundreds of coins that it lists on its exchange and has no regard for AML and KYC laws. Craig said he himself was able to create 100 gmail accounts in a day and create binance accounts with each of those gmail accounts and from the same wallet, deposit and withdraw 1 bitcoin into each of those in one day ($8000 x 100) without facing any restrictions or triggering any alerts or such. This post could ramble on for ever and ever exposing the complexities of the rabbit hole but I wanted to offer some perspective on what’s been happening in the space. What is being built on the bitcoin SV blockchain is something that I can only partially comprehend but even from my limited understanding of what it is to become, I can see that the entirety of the crypto community is extremely threatened as it renders all the various alt coins and alt coin exchanges obsolete. It makes criminals play by the rules, it removes any power from the developer groups and turns the blockchain and the miners in to economies of scale where the blockchain acts as a serverless database, the miners provide computational resources/storage/RAM and you interact with a virtual machine through a monitor and keyboard plugged in to an ethernet port. It will be like something that takes us from a type 0 to a type 1 civilisation. There are many that like to keep us in the quagmire of corruption and criminality as it lines their pockets. Much much more can be read about the Cartel in crypto in the archive below. Is it possible this cartel has the resources to mount such a successful psychological operation on the cryptocurrency community that they manage to convince everyone that Craig is the bad guy, when he’s the only one calling for regulation, the application of the law, the storage of immutable records onchain to comply with banking secrecy laws, for Global Sound Money? https://archive.fo/lk1lH#selection-3671.46-3671.55 Please note, where possible, images were uploaded onto the bitcoin sv blockchain through bitstagram paying about 10c a pop. If I wished I could then use an application etch and archive this post to the chain to be immutably stored. If this publishing forum was on chain too it would mean that when I do the archive the images that are in the bitstragram links (but stored in the bitcoin blockchain/database already) could be referenced in the archive by their txid so that they don’t have to be stored again and thus bringing the cost of the archive down to only the html and css.
2019 Records The Highest Number Of Attacks, But 2018 Was The Year With The Most Significant Amount Of Stolen Crypto As the crypto sector seeks further ways for eliminating hacker attacks, last year, Chainalysis recorded 11 attacks on exchanges and custodial services. Despite the number of attacks, 2019 isn’t as fruitful for hackers, as the total amount reached “just” $238 million. 2018, for instance, records an all-time high of crypto heists as $875,5 million worth of cryptocurrencies were stolen in only six cyber attacks. The research team at Chainalysis came up with a report showing the number and amount of funds stolen from hacking. The group clarified that phishing attacks or sudden exit scams are not taken into consideration, as they use less-technical attacks like malware and luring victims into providing their wallet addresses and private keys. Furthermore, the Chainalysis team only took into consideration the attacks that lead to illicit activities on exchanges. The most significant hacking attack in 2019 was on CoinBene, with total worth of $105 million through the theft of 109 different ERC-20 tokens stolen from the exchange. At the beginning, the exchange was refusing about the attack, but researchers found out the total amount of tokens was forcefully taken from Coinbene’s hot wallet. $49 million worth of Ethereum disappeared from Upbit’s hot wallet. The exchange, however, stated that the stolen funds were not a part of their users` belongings, so user assets were kept securely. Binance, the world’s largest crypto exchange to date, also suffered from a hacking attack. Despite Binance’s tight security measures, the hackers gained access to the hot wallet via a combination of phishing attacks and a special withdrawal algorithm to bypass Binance’s security protocol. Bitpoint lost $32 million worth of various cryptocurrencies, Bithumb got stung with $19 million worth of Ethereum (ETH) and Ripple (XRP) tokens. At the same time, Cryptopia suffered from a $16 million worth of ETH and ERC-20 token hit. The 11 hits also include exchanges like DragonEx, Bitrue, Vindaxm, and LocalBitcoins. Source: Chainalysis The Chainalysis team created a break down of occured thefts, based on the average and median amount stolen. It turns out, the number of crypto funds stolen per heist dropped drastically in 2019, when comparing it with 2018, for example. The data suggest exchanges are now increasingly aware of the situation and are trying to mitigate or at least lessen the effect of potential crypto theft. Most of the stolen funds are going into other exchanges, then exchanged for fiat currencies. However, there are still funds, sitting in wallets, which gives law enforcement officials a chance to discover the culprits. And as exchanges are increasing their security measures, hackers also sophisticate their methods for infiltration. Exchange operators now keep small amounts in their hot wallets, while most of the funds are locked in cold wallets. Also, exchanges are relying more on authentication procedures and transaction monitoring. Exchanges in 2019 shared more information on the crypto hack than ever before, which is beneficial for the entire crypto community. However, hacker groups like the Lazarus project take crypto attacks to a whole new level. Believed to be behind the WannaCry ransomware attacks in 2017, as well as the 2014 Sony Pictures attack, Lazarus now uses more and more sophisticated hacking methods. Most of their hacking is based on social engineering, evolving into one of the most elaborate hacking strategies in the crypto sector. Lazarus also uses mixing pools to cover up their tracks. Mixing pools gather illicit funds and then transfers them back with a “mixed” origin for a 1-3% fee.
https://preview.redd.it/5tef4jw4dyo31.png?width=679&format=png&auto=webp&s=fa9ebddb44e9097538a3ae81a8ed577b441ad690 As the value and visibility of cryptocurrencies continue to rise, the industry is gradually being exposed to increasingly sophisticated security issues. While institutional players typically have the resources and expertise to fortify their assets under multiple layers of defense, retail investors must take it upon themselves to learn about different types of attacks and determine how to mitigate these risks. To that end, we’ve compiled some of the most common yet devastating security risks below:
Traditional Web Infrastructure Attacks
Digital currency exchanges, like other industries, run end-applications on web services which are oftentimes not built from the ground up with security considerations in mind. As a result, the legacy infrastructure of many popular online service providers is not sufficiently future-proofed against evolving web security risks, which can allow external parties to take remote control of a company’s server or crash the intranet. Compromised systems are susceptible to SQL injections and other similar attacks, which can modify a transaction address and reconfigure critical user authorizations, much like the ComboJack malware. Even if a digital platform is generally well-constructed, the way it is tethered to the internet can still be exploited. Web hosts which expose network services to the Internet are relentlessly attacked, and multiple studies indicate that a publicly exposed host is typically discovered and attacked within minutes of being placed on the network. From there, malicious actors would be able to directly attack the exposed host and re-appropriate it for their ends.
Traditionally, front-running occurs when traders use insider knowledge or high-frequency trading algorithms to detect orders from rival traders, then rapidly inject their order in front of that trade, leading the rival to buy at a higher cost and increasing the value of the front-runner’s newly purchased asset. This is an issue in both cryptocurrency trading and stock trading, but while front-running in traditional markets is restricted by a variety of regulations, the cryptocurrency market is far less regulated and therefore more susceptible to market manipulation. Front-running within the cryptocurrency space is particularly egregious, as there have been multiple cases where attackers use their funds to open a low position for a particular cryptocurrency while using funds stolen from a large exchange account to artificially inflate the currency price, pulling the compromised user up to the high position. As a result, the attacker’s positions are sold first, and the stolen user’s funds are then transferred to out of their account through the secondary market for a quick profit. These attacks were commonplace during the ICO craze due to the overwhelming public interest in the potential windfall ICOs insinuated, with little attention paid to the dangers imposed by such attacks. Furthermore, few cryptocurrency exchanges are willing to proactively announce these attacks due to the reputational damage it could incur.
Although they are relatively low-tech, phishing attacks have grown increasingly sophisticated and are notoriously hard to prevent since they exploit social behavior to achieve their goals. BitcoinTalk’s network service provider was compromised by a successful phishing attack in 2015, and even Binance was forced to deal with the aftermath of a widespread phishing scheme last year, during which attackers used stolen funds to artificially pump and dump a variety of altcoins for their own gain. In these cases, anonymous groups were able to identify key individuals with access credentials to multiple databases or servers, then implement a coordinated, high-precision phishing attack to acquire those credentials. As a result, the damage resulting from phishing attacks oftentimes extends beyond the initial victim, reverberating negatively throughout an entire system.
As more people create online crypto-related accounts and transact digital assets, the volume of inadvertent user information disclosures skyrocketed. This is mainly because most people are accustomed to using a fixed set of account passwords, which provides attackers with an opening. Sophisticated attackers can simply parse through entire libraries of leaked data, obtain potentially relevant identification credentials or partial digital signature information which they can then use to access and empty a user’s account. Even without a full user password, more tech-savvy attackers are also able to exploit hash function collisions to bypass protocols such as MD5 and SHA-1, which are widely used to build authentication and integrity mechanisms in cryptographic protocols.
Temporary Network Hijacking
Temporary network hijacking utilizes military-grade tactics to replace the target network of close contact with the target network to achieve further attacks. Attacks of this nature typically involve a Trojan malware component designed to spread internally within an infected system, moving laterally from an internet-connected remote monitoring server to other devices and systems that weren’t meant to be exposed. To date, network hijacking malware has been found in everything from government servers in North America to an operational technology network controlling water utilities across Europe. While within the context of crypto, these attacks have only involved relatively benign crypto-mining malware, coupled with more disruptive cyberterrorism tactics which are capable of shutting down large-scale national targets. The effects of a temporary network hijacking could severely compromise the entire internet architecture upon which the bourgeoning crypto ecosystem relies on. As crypto assets take up an increasingly large portion of many investors’ portfolio, there is also an increasing need to understand the underlying principles of the blockchain and appreciate the importance of private keys. Every crypto investor needs to take digital asset protection very seriously, and at Cobo, our central motivation is to support secure and streamlined blockchain development and make it easier to own and utilize the crypto tokens of your choice. To this end, Cobo Wallet’s Hardware Security Module technology ensures that the vast majority of our user assets are stored in a fully offline, globally distributed system, and are further protected by multiple software layer protocols and a multi-signature mechanism which prevents funds from getting lost due to a single point of failure. Cybercrime will continue to evolve in tandem with the cryptocurrency sector and industry digitization, and many online exchanges and even hardware custodial solutions are not equipped to repel the full spectrum of approaches and tools malicious actors can implement. As you take steps to safeguard your digital assets, it is imperative that you thoroughly research your crypto custodianship options, avoid making purchases from third-party distributors, and ensure that your wallet’s security mechanisms are pressure-tested against the worst possible scenarios.
We are a free society united by the basic idea of freedom and justice, separated from geographical, religious, ethnic and gender prejudices, we reaffirm this document, and we promise to protect freedom and benefit people always and everywhere.
The PORTBITX project team creates a service whose main idea is to provide a mobile and convenient system where users and cryptocurrency owners can receive a wide range of services.
1 The essence of the project
The project team asks you to support the creation of a high-tech, simple, convenient and honest ecosystem for people who need to protect their rights and freedoms and use the right to be anonymous and financially independent. The mission of the project is to create a service for storing and exchanging cryptocurrency assets, and also to become a tool allowing to conduct trading operations regardless of geographic location or language skills. Advantages of the project:
Affordable and user-friendly interface;
More than 1500 types of cryptocurrency assets;
A large number of types of cryptocurrency pairs;
The possibility of profit from the service PORTBITX;
The ability to influence the strategy and operation of the service
PORTBITX, by voting;
Anonymity and confidentiality of the person;
Investing in other projects on the PORTBITX platform;
Creating your own projects;
Minimum commission for exchange operations;
Minimum commission in trade operations;
No or minimal transfer fee for PORTBITX.
2 State of affairs
Owing to ignorance or low awareness of people about the nature of cryptocurrency assets, cryptoindustry is mythologized in modern society. This applies to both ordinary people and officials in authority. As a rule, in the minds of people there is more confidence in traditional financial instruments than in technology during their development, for example blockchain (the inability to change the information block / blockchain chain).History knows many examples when the governments of different countries, guided by the interests of their citizens, inadvertently led to the decline of advanced civil initiatives. This time is a period of complex formation of crypto-economics and state relations, which is still in the making. The project that we present to your attention has no borders between countries and peoples. And we, a group of enthusiasts, would very much like to cooperate with large government organizations. But, to our deep regret, the states currently at the stage of formation of their cryptocurrency policies make mistakes that negatively affect the crypto community. The market of cryptocurrency assets, which has a ten-year history of development, is very sensitive to various statements by officials. However, unqualified criticism cannot withstand the global trend. And no one can stop the future. With all the desire, time does not stand still, technologies themselves continue to evolve, new technologies, new projects, new views that can be upgraded in the distant future, as well as processes of government and regulation themselves, to introduce innovative elements into them. We do not expect the distant future, and many tools are available now. And we have something to offer you. This is especially relevant against the backdrop of the upcoming global financial crisis, with the inevitable decline in trust in state financial institutions; cryptocurrency have high chances of becoming more popular in the absence of other technological alternatives. As we noted earlier, there is a lack of awareness among people about Blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies. These technologies are extremely undervalued, since there is much more benefit in them than one can imagine. In the cryptocurrency assets industry itself, there are fraudsters at this time who are trying to steal or fraudulently get your money. At the same time, there are many honest crypto projects that can not be realized due to stereotypes of perception of them as fraudulent. Objectively, they could be judged by their work and projects that have been successfully implemented. In principle, it is necessary to be cautious in terms of investing in any projects, even if they are guaranteed by reputable people or companies. No reputable person or company can match the level of guarantee and security of your assets, as in the Bitcoin blockchain.In any case, the decision to invest is yours, not imposed by restrictions, and the responsibility lies with you. According to Road Map, we intend to fulfill all the terms of the agreement with our participants. We do not promise you a high yield of our tokens, we put all our experience into the overall welfare of the project and each user. There will be no delisting on the service until the community votes for the opposite. Our risk is collective. We urge you to make an adequate and balanced choice, instead of imposing any other opinion on you. We are not supporters of aggressive marketing. There are many cryptocurrency assets and it’s difficult for a regular user to store and exchange them, as well as use them in everyday life.
User choice is limited, since most centralized services such as crypto exchanges, have only 3-4 major currencies for converting all the others;
the inability to use a large number of different pairs – many exchange services cannot provide such an exchange;
many centralized services require identity verification;most services do not provide remuneration for owning company tokens or users do not share company profits among themselves;
some centralized services hide revenues earned during Hardfork;
almost no one service does not give the right to address strategic issues
for the service. The right is always for the service;
public opinion can not affect the cryptocurrency service;
There is no way to verify the accuracy of data provided by a cryptocurrency service.
These are problems that affect users and cryptocurrency in general.
The PORTBITX project guarantees compliance with all of its obligations and user rights. We integrate community communications into our PORTBITX service. Users are offered the following functions:
We do not limit users in choosing their currency conversion. the ability to exchange and trade any cryptocurrency assets. The user can exchange one cryptocurrency asset for any other. For such operations in the PORTBITX service, a multitude of cryptocurrency pairs is presented;
No verification. Anonymity will be respected under any circumstances. The right to conceal one’s identity is necessary primarily for people living in countries that do not respect human rights, where freedoms are violated and where the law does not work for the benefit of people;
distribution of service profit for all members of the PORTBITX community under the terms of the user agreement;
obtaining additional coins or tokens received in consequence of Hardfork (fork). Disclose all income received during the occurrence of a fork, the distribution takes place on the conditions provided by the company performing the fork;
affect portbitx. Members of the PORTBITX community have the right to vote on the terms of the user agreement. Voting is closed, the results are publicly announced after the end of the voting;
we update the local blockchain online, which contains information on all movements of funds;
facilitating and expanding the functions of exchange operations. We are designed to solve difficulties in the exchange or sale of any cryptocurrency asset to the desired;
transaction speed of more than 20,000 per second within the ecosystem, which will instantly make online purchases with a minimum commission;
the creation of a sub-ecosystem is intended to facilitate the popularization of the crypto world and expand the horizons for trade and manufacturing enterprises;
for cryptoindustry, we create a new kind of cooperation with users and set a new trend in the formation of a conscious and free society.
Direct market competitors are all decentralized and centralized services related to the purchase or sale of cryptoactive assets, as well as services that provide storage services on a cold or hot crypto wallet. More than 16 thousand services and more than 2 thousand types of cryptocurrency assets. We have the opportunity to offer our clients a reliable and open service for the storage and exchange of cryptocurrency assets. The main competitors are such large cryptocurrency exchanges like Binance, Bitfinix, Bitrix, etc. These multibillion-dollar projects that can affect the entire market and regulate pricing also have millions of crypto communities. This position is deserved by their work. There are, of course, disadvantages associated with the opacity of their activities, unlike us, but in general they play an important role in the cryptoindustry. Their trading volumes are impressive and inspiring, their mistakes lead to sharp price fluctuations in the crypto market. There are still crypto exchange. In comparison with the leaders, they are significantly inferior in the volume and number of users. These exchanges include the bulk of all crypto exchanges on the market. There are also exchange services on the market that allow you to exchange fiat money for cryptocurrency assets. Most often the commission is quite expensive. For example, they can range from 1% to 20%. Such a high commission can be explained by the fact that the locations where buyers and sellers are located have government restrictions or are prohibited. In addition to all of the above, there are closed groups in social networks or instant messengers. There, people discuss and agree on the price and method of payment. Commissions are often not high from 0% to 5%, but one should not hope that such operations can be safe, since personal meetings are always accompanied by a risk to life or health. Exchange transactions in the onion network may have no guarantees at all that the transaction will be successful. In deep web, everything works on credibility / reputation, and the higher the seller’s rating, the higher the likelihood of a successful outcome of the transaction. In the same place, you can sell tagged or stolen cryptocurrency assets. For this, there are special mixing sites to hide the criminal trail. These types of exchange operations are the most unreliable. For this reason, one of the safest types of exchange operations is large centralized cryptocurrency exchanges. Such centralized services, sometimes using their position, impose their own rules, which leads to a loss of users’ material values. PORTBITX is designed to empower cryptographic protection for maximum convenience and simplicity, as well as to protect the funds and personal data of users. PORTBITX connects all cryptocurrency assets into one transport hub and creates highly efficient curvilinear isolation of the currency to make cryptocurrency as safe and close to people as possible.
A registered user of the PORTBITX portal can be any person supporting the general idea of a free society. Our users are anonymous and financially independent, with the right to vote and the right to receive common incomes obtained by the operation of the portal and the activity of the crypto community PORTBITX. For whom we create a service:
owners of cryptocurrency assets;
people who want to participate in the development of the crypto industry;
people who want to make a profit in the crypto market actively or passively;
people who want to maintain their right to anonymity;
people want transparency and publicity;
It can be ordinary housewives, entrepreneurs, unemployed, self-employed, freelancers, people who invest in the future, wealthy investors, etc. One of the advantages of the service is anonymity, which gives anyone the right to save and earn around the world online, without fear that tomorrow they will be forced to pay some strange fees or licenses. Service users are interested in the distribution and real use of cryptocurrency. Self-regulating community PORTBITX, respecting the rights of all project participants. Service users are:
The user of the service does not have PORTBITX tokens frozen in his account;
Service user with the right to profit;
User with the right to profit and the right to vote.
For trust in the trade service there will be a seller rating for all types of goods and services presented. There will be a book of reviews about each seller, where each buyer has the right to leave a review about the product or service. This scheme is actively used in Darknet. The basic principle: the more positive reviews, the more trust. Each seller values his authority and thus provides the best possible product or service. The expression “customer is always right,” works because no one wants to lose their customers.Currently, according to blockchain.com, there are used 34 million people who hold their funds in Bitcoin. The remaining number of users is difficult to calculate, but according to our modest calculations, there are at least 2 times more other users in any other currency. This suggests that there is still a great demand on the market for services of safe storage and exchange of cryptocurrency assets.
Bounty is a reward of users for PR-activity: subscriptions on forums, maintenance of topics in local language versions, translation of documents into a local language, publications in social networks, blogs and so on. The terms of the bounty are published in the user profile of the section Terms and conditions of the bounty campaign. To participate in the bounty campaign, bounty hunter, you need to register on the site PORTBITX. You agree to the terms and conditions of the Bounty campaign if you register and do Bounty Hunt. Tasks and their description are listed in the special section “Bounty Hunt”. Each task is individual and has its own characteristics, so bounty hunters are invited to carefully study the conditions of each task. Rewards are described in each task separately. The results of remuneration depend on the correct execution of the task.The remuneration is charged to the user’s personal account in the personal account. There is also a payment history for completed tasks. After the last fundraising stage, all information will be deleted in favor of the anonymity of users. We will also delete information about site visits and personal information that was required to specify to receive a reward. In the case of a request by third parties for data, we did not have information that could harm bounty hunters. The bounty budget is 14,325,893 PORTBITX. The distribution of tokens in stages is as follows: Stage 1 – 6,325,000 PORTBITX; Stage 2 – 4 000 000 PORTBITX; Stage 3 – 4 000 893 PORTBITX. Distribution of PORTBITX tokens:
Remuneration for completed tasks – 9,283,178.7 PORTBITX;
Referral system by activity – 1 031 464.3 PORTBITX;
Investment Referral System – 11,250 – 4,011,250 PORTBITX.
If the ICO is not successful, the invested funds will be returned to investors, and the reward for bounty hunters will be canceled. For this reason, we regulate and monitor the social activity of the bounty hunters so that the conduct of all ICO stages is successful. For bounty campaigns, an application to the technical department is provided in order to correct them immediately in case of errors, as well as to assist the bounty hunters in carrying out their tasks. We are building a healthy community, so we ask that the personal opinion and evaluation of the project PORTBITX of each participant be objective and adequate. Each participant in the campaign bounty is our representative, and for us it is important to have a clear understanding of the face of responsibility and benefit that the community carries out.
On the market there are many companies involved in the exchange and storage of cryptocurrency assets. The number of such services is more than 16,000 and this is not the limit, but it is precisely in the face of fierce competition that truly unique and competitive projects are born. This market situation motivates us to create a truly useful and necessary service in order to make the range of our service available to a wide range of people. Recently, according to Google Trends, interest in cryptocurrency has fallen significantly. Now interest has rolled back to the area of 2016-17. Cryptocurrency industry continues to function and develop. Now on the blockchain, you can create your own e-government, your own elections and currency, everything is limited only by the imagination of all industry participants. The ecosystem is actively developing for the use of cryptocurrency in trading operations. Governments and regulators in different countries are seeking greater transparency in the cryptocurrency industry. Some, such as the Japanese government, license and regulate crypto exchange and services. In Japan, cryptocurrency has long been accepted as a means of payment in many outlets. In states with despotic regimes and an unstable economy, one of the few tools for the preservation and enhancement of assets is Bitcoin, for this reason in these countries the rate can differ greatly from the average market rate. The financial crisis and the instability of markets around the world continues to cause fear among people. In some countries want to ban circulation of dollars. Gold cannot be bought in the usual way and owners may experience some difficulties in working with it. Gold has long ceased to be a means of payment. The priority for us is the safe storage of cryptocurrency assets, maximum user convenience and integration, the popularization of the cryptoindustry in everyday life. In order for cryptocurrency assets to be used and an integral part of human activity, we want to form a stable market. At the moment, the capitalization of the entire market for a number of years fluctuates in the range of $ 100– $ 300 billion. The range of exchange operations ranges from $ 13-16 billion per day. The number of cryptocurrency assets represented on the markets is more than 2000 types. The dominance of the main cryptocurrency Bitcoin is in the range of 49-52% of the entire market. The tendency to reduce the main quotes scares potential investors, but this is not a reason for surrendering positions to a multi-million dollar audience of crypto enthusiasts. The reason why people continue to create new projects and new systems for exchange and transactional systems is the benefits they bring to humanity. In the market, as well as around the world, there are many unscrupulous developers who need to fight. We are engaged in creating and securing the credibility of the cryptoindustry so that the user can choose a reliable service or network, and not imposed by anyone. This is one of the fundamental aspects of a free community. The right of choice for the user, “the client is always right” is an integral part of the philosophy of the PORTBITX project. By the level of their responsibility, transparency, advanced thought, innovation, in the future, the work of PORTBITX will judge all cryptomir. The better we, PORTBITX work for the good of society, the more trust we have and the more users use the PORTBITX service. PORTBITX is part of a new culture, part of an ecosystem where the core value is reputation based on trust. This is a project where reputation is more important than money, and utility and service to people is more important than ostentatious hospitality and external gloss, and the safety of the assets of our project participants is more important than our profit indicators. Capitalization is growing steadily from year to year. At the beginning of 2017, the capacity of the crypto market was around $ 19 billion. Now capitalization has grown to $ 200 billion. The growth is colossal, but the market is still young and there will be many more challenges on the way to which all market participants will have to respond. And our participants will be the most prepared. The number of new blockchains and new projects is growing, and the number of participants in the crypto market is also growing. As a result, the attitude of people to the cryptoindustry is changing for the better, just like the cryptoindustry itself. In 2017, the known cryptocurrency assets were less than 800 species, but now their number has grown. Now on the market represented more than 2,000 species. Not all assets are honest, there are those whose purpose is to obtain short-term profits, which badly affects the reputation and trust in the cryptoindustry. But, if we recall the story of the beginning of our amazing world, then the price for one Bitcoin was $ 0.00000003. Since then, the situation in the cryptoindustry has changed dramatically.In the future, the cryptoindustry market is waiting for great popularity and that is why reliable and honest services for the storage and exchange of cryptocurrency assets like our project will be needed. Sharp volatility is such because the market is relatively young and has not reached even a tenth of its potential and capitalization. Therefore, the time in which we live is just a starting point. The world has already passed the Rubicon and there is a long and interesting road ahead. The potential market we can serve in the future is more than one billion users. Now this market is slightly less than 50 million users. Experts expect that in the future cryptocurrencies will replace the official fiat money.
PORTBITX is a digital portal for storing, exchanging and trading cryptocurrency assets, as well as a platform for selling goods and services for cryptocurrency. The service is managed by the community by voting. Voting topics are offered through a special application in the voting section. Service has three main areas. Secure storage of cryptocurrency. Secure storage of over 1500 different cryptoactive assets. Safety is ensured by safe cold the repository. The service itself is not directly connected to the repository to prevent the penetration of potentially dangerous programs. The security of user data in the service itself is protected by a local block chain. The entire database and operations are recorded on the principle of a distributed registry. Hacking one server should do this with hundreds of others located in different places. Mining in this block chain is not performed because all the costs of maintaining such security are borne by the service itself. The PORTBITX development team is fully responsible for the security of cryptocurrency assets and for the operation of the service. One of the most vulnerable links in the safety chain is the human factor (concerns not only users, but also developers). For this reason, it is necessary to double-check scenarios, conduct stress testing and carefully select personnel. Exchange This is a portal for exchanging all available cryptocurrency assets for any other. The number of assets available on the portal will be recorded in the blockchain for a reliable display of the volume, the number of wallets, users and information on all the operations performed since the launch of the main network will also be indicated in the blockchain. Any cryptocurrency asset can be exchanged for any other if it is in demand. The market decides for itself how and in what to trade. All exchange orders will be visible in online charts. Potentially, we will add more than 2,500,000 pairs to the portal, but not immediately, but in parts and as each cryptocurrency asset is checked. Also the choice for coins or tokens will always be behind the PORTBITX community. After each vote, all results will be published in the section “Voting” and on the official website of the service. The portal has a convenient interface and an open registry, i.e. users will be able to monitor and control the network with developers. Also, with certain voting results, there may be additions to the network.In the future, we want to release the service in free navigation and stop controlling the network. If we succeed, we will open source code and create jobs for miners. Marketplace Marketplace is valid for the sale of services and products for cryptocurrency. High-quality and convenient service. All transactions on the Marketplace are recorded in the main register of the local blockchain. A wide range of products available advertising products and services, two types of payment (with a guarantee and with a reputation) to choose from. The following portal functionality: Voting / referendum An important component of the PORTBITX portal is voting / referendum. A variety of topics and surveys can be submitted to a vote, directly related to the PORTBITX community and the portal itself. For example, changes in tariff rates, adding new tokens, adding new services and additions to the service. The right to vote is the right to decide the fate of the community, the right to find the best solution to the problems, the right to be free, honest and fair. One voice is 5000 PORTBITX. (this limit can be lowered if the community decides on a general vote). Since tokens can be sold on third-party services, they cannot automatically take part in voting. Also, all available tokens on the portal should be frozen for a period of voting that lasts no more than 24 hours, starting at 00:00 Central European Time. Tokens are frozen through the user’s personal account in the voting section.Persons who do not have enough tokens for voting, but having the right to profit PORTBITX have the opportunity to see the voting results, as well as to make their proposals for the next vote. Persons who do not have enough tokens for the right to vote and the right to profit will have the opportunity to group together for collective voting. Results and coverage of all voting results will be immediately published after the end on the portal’s main page. A vote is considered legitimate if a quorum gains 65% of the total number of votes. The decision on the outcome of the vote can be made if the number of those who agreed to 100% of those who participated in the vote is 60%. Voting can be repeated if uncrowded by a majority. In this case, the proposal will be revised. The deadline for a deferred vote may pass unplanned within two weeks after the end of the first vote. If, in the second ballot, the majority of votes will also not reach the bulk of 60%, then this issue will be postponed or canceled and will not be considered within the next 6 months. The right to vote is not just an opportunity to influence the portal, it is the will of the community that developers must obey. The right to profit The right to profit is obtained by freezing tokens through the user’s personal account for a period of at least one month. The number of tokens needed to make a profit of at least 1000 PORTBITX. The calculation of the distribution of profits are as follows. All profits from all services provided by the service for a certain period of time in the tokens in which the activity was performed are distributed in relation to all community members who have frozen the tokens directly on the service portal. The profit is distributed in the same currencies in which it was received on the service. In the event that the frozen asset of the PORTBITX tokens is defrosted ahead of time, then the profit it receives during this period will be distributed among the other participants whose tokens remain frozen. Participation in the project is proved by deed and rewarded, in all fairness. All profits, namely the estimated profits of users during and at the end of the period can be tracked and seen in the registry on the main page accessible to all interested parties. PORTBITX developers do not hide revenues and honestly share them with the community. Each user has the opportunity to check the registry and find their own account.Maximum openness and transparency is the key to trust and success of the service.
10 Road Map
Website creation ICO PORTBITX.com;
Conducting and forming a trust sheet (trust list is the journalists and investors who will participate in the ICO);
Stress tolerance testing;
Starting a Bounty Company;
1st stage ICO: Software;
Creation and improvement of software for the portal;
Testing and announcement of results in the form of a report, publicly;
Running a test version of the portal;
Launch of the 2nd Bounty Company;
2nd stage ICO technical equipment of the portal;
Technical equipment and process debugging;
Create mobile version;
Expansion of cryptocurrency pairs;
Launch of beta portal version;
Launch of the 3rd Bounty Company;
3rd stage ICO final part of the main project;
Creating a cryptocurrency exchange;
Creating an ecosystem (attracting entrepreneurs and trading companies to the project);
Creating a trading platform for entrepreneurs and freelancers;
Testing the trade portal;
Maximum expansion of cryptocurrency pairs;
Adaptation and testing of the mobile version;
Launch of a commercial portal for entrepreneurs and freelancers;
Launch of the mobile version of the portal;
Enhance user data security;
Official launch of the portal (second birthday).
11 Economy and Demand
All information on the movement of funds and their spending will be published on the official website of the company in a special reporting form. All actions performed by PORTBITX will be covered in the news section of the company’s website.The voting results and the timing of their holding, as well as the topics discussed for voting will be in the user’s personal account in the “voting” section.To date, only about 80 million people have a cryptocurrency, store it or use it in payments. Now there’s practically no way to find a person who hasn’t heard about bitcoin or blockchain at least once. The cause of mistrust is people who undermine the true face and good intentions of the founding pioneers of the cryptoindustry. The market is too small and hypervolatil, but this trend will continue only for some time, until the total market capitalization reaches 1 trillion. USD This milestone will further open the way to even more people who want to be part of the crypto world. A larger number of participants will make this market more stable and less prone to hypervolatility.Unfortunately, there are many scammers and individuals who undermine the basis of the industry, and its usefulness. Therefore, the PORTBITX development team creates a service safe for the safety of users’ funds. According to statistics provided by Blockchain.com from March 2018 to February 2019, the number of new users who registered new cryptocurrency wallets increased from 23 million to 33 million. Based on the data obtained, it can be concluded that there is a need for reliable storage of their cryptocurrency assets. The year 2019 is a preparatory platform for an even larger number of users, so we decided to create a portal for the ecosystem of the cryptocurrency industry.
12 Project Team
One of the important factors in the decision making for an investor is the transparency and fame of the team that works on the project. An investor can check team members, evaluate and decide on investments. The knowledge and experience of the team is a kind of guarantee that the project will be implemented, but as is often the case in real life, this may be far from reality. In the cryptoindustry, nothing can be 100% sure. Any ICO defaults to scam. If you have doubts about our decency, we suggest investing a small amount. By collecting the minimum amount, we will demonstrate in practice that we are credible, because our goal is to benefit the community. Founders of PORTBITX Co-founder and Technical Director Steve Man Co-founder and CEO of CharleySJ Director of Marketing and Public Relations MAD Phoenix Director of Methodology and Legal Support at PenA
The minimum capitalization of the project at the first stage is 1,450 ETH. The minimum total capitalization of the project will be 56,000 ETH. The maximum capitalization of the project can reach more than 160,450 ETH. Tokens will be issued in the amount of 143,258,928.57142. Share will be up to 8 decimal places. ICO is calculated in three stages. We create a product that meets modern requirements and market challenges. Additional issue is not provided. After the last stage of the ICO, all assets not sold will be destroyed. We initially limit the emission of tokens in order to avoid a large amount of excess asset. Being part of the PORTBITX community means having the privilege of voting and profit of the service. And that means – to understand the idea and share the philosophy of the cryptoindustry and with full responsibility to approach the decisions that will affect the community. The opportunity to receive a bonus will be among the participants of the Bounty campaign and among ICO investors, but by decision of the crypto community. Return of investment will be carried out in several ways. By obtaining distributed service profit Due to the possibility of selling a token at the market price, which can be ten times higher than the initial cost. The token will be based on the ERC20. The predicted price of a token at the end of an ICO can be about $ 3.7. The projected service revenue for the first year may be more than $ 500 million. Pricing can be changed if there is an ETH price manipulation before release. The news about the name and the release of tokens will be announced in the official news, so you should not give in to manipulation.
14 ICO Features
Jurisdiction: Blockchain The number of tokens is 143 million. On ICO 80.225 million On a bounty campaign of 14.3 million The developers and founders of 34.382 million, and the maintenance of the service 14.3 million. Distribution will be carried out automatically. The following fundraising is provided: Stage 1 – 1,450 ETH Stage 2 – 10,000 ETH Stage 3 – 149,000 ETH Pricing and limits 1st stage ICO 1 PBX = 0.002 ETH 1 ETH / 0.002 = 500 PBX 5 ETH / 0.0015 = 3 333.33333333 PBX 10 ETH / 0.001 = 10,000 PBX Rules of the first stage: The minimum amount to raise funds 1,450 Price is limited to pricing policy. Bounty company 6 million Refund in case of not reaching the minimum amount to raise funds 2nd stage ICO 1 PBX / 0.003 ETH 1 ETH / 0.003 = 333.33333333 PBX 5 ETH / 0.0025 = 2,000 PBX 10 ETH / 0.002 = 5,000 PBX 3rd stage ICO 1 PBX / 0.004 ETH 0.5 ETH / 0.004 = 125 PBX 1 ETH / 0.0035 = 285.71428571 PBX 5 ETH / 0.003 = 1 666.66666666 PBX 10 ETH / 0.0025 = 4,000 PBX
15 Legal aspects
Placement of the company – Blockchain. This is due to the fact that we approach the project with full responsibility and are aware of the consequences of our actions, as well as due to pressure from some states and their unfriendly policy to the cryptoindustry. Also, the service will not be present fiatnye currency, as their existence is not combined with the philosophy of our company. We will temporarily not specify the location of the company, as well as disclose the names of developers for the safety of their rights to life, health and freedom. Since we consider ourselves a free community, some data for the sake of security for the sake of this freedom will be hidden from outsiders. We guarantee a refund in case of unsuccessful first stage at 100% minus the miners commission. This is important because the tools incorporated in the first stage are necessary for creating the kernel and the subsequent imposition of software modules. We considered options for direct investment in the project from private investors, but since these investors could influence our strategy and policies, and since they could take some of the functions from the community, we decided to invest in our project as a community by Ico. The risk of investing in our project, of course, is great, but we want to build a really useful service for the industry as a whole and for each user of the service separately. Therefore, we enable the community to judge us by our work.
The journalist of BBC has lost £25,000 in Ethereum because of technical illiteracy
Business reporter of British media company \"BBC\" has told how he lost cryptocurrency savings because of the typical rookie mistake. The editorial staff of "BBC" Monty Manford published a report about how he lost 25,000 pounds ($30,000) in Ethereum due to lack of technical literacy. Manford first acquired the cryptocurrency at the end of 2017 at the peak of the bitcoin price. "I heard about bitcoin, but it was one of those technologies where I nodded my head wisely when I was in the same room with those who talked about it... But when the price of bitcoins reached its peak — about $ 20,000 (16,500 pounds) at the end of 2017 — an increase of more than 100,000% in seven years — my curiosity overcame me." His choice fells on Ethereum. According to the journalist, he was making long-term investments that he thought could help him when he retired. Manford hoped that Ethereum would follow the growing bitcoin and also demonstrate a sharp rise. Manford described his experience with cryptocurrencies as "absolutely terrifying." Storage he chose the wallet MyEtherWallet, not a crypto currency exchange for fear of break-ins and security breaches. Manford had both a public and a private key, and he knew that the private key had to be kept securely, otherwise he would risk losing access to his wallet. But then Manford came up with a less “brilliant” idea: "I was printed it out, but also made the fateful decision to keep it in Gmail drafts so I could copy and paste it when I needed to make a transaction, and not print it every time." Saving a private cryptographic key on Google mail servers or in any third-party free mail services is similar to the situation when you leave the key in the car with the engine turned on and think that no one will steal the car, writes the Bitcoinist edition. Manford realized that he had made a mistake only when he saw that his wallet was empty. He traced the path of the stolen tokens to the wallets belonging to the Binance crypto-exchange. But exchange did not respond quickly to the letters of Manford with the requirement to freeze the accounts of the alleged criminals. Binance requested official confirmation of the crime. Then the journalist turned to the American company CipherBlade, which cooperates with the FBI to track down the scammers. Cybersecurity experts have found that social engineering or phishing techniques were most likely used to access a journalist's Gmail account, as well as predatory programs that intercepted information when pressing copy/paste. Manfred also filed a statement with the cybercrime Department of the Sussex police, which contacted Binance and was able to obtain information from the crypto-exchange about the IP addresses from which deposits with the stolen cryptocurrency were made. They are in the Netherlands, but it has not been possible to identify the criminals. Manford highlights the main problems associated with investing in cryptocurrencies: ● Consumer protection does not apply to Bitcoin or Ethereum investors. ● Ethereum and other cryptocurrencies can be stolen in seconds. ● The problem with passwords — or private keys —they can be stolen. According to Manfred, consumers are not protected when it comes to keeping a secret key. "Writing down a secret key on paper can also be dangerous. A fire in the house, a flood, a hungry pet — just a bad memory — could mean that a huge amount of cryptocurrency is lost forever." The journalist concludes his story with the words that he feels as if he was "in a wild Bazaar, where criminals can easily clean his pockets and they will do nothing for it." #News #Negligence #Journalist #Binance#Cryptocurrency #Bitcoin #Ethereum
The hackers were able to bypass Binance’s strong security and all the rules put in place to stop such an attack. The warning signals only went off when the BTC was already moved off the exchange to a single bitcoin wallet. Binance assured users that their funds are safe and that it would be covered by the SAFU fund put in place for this very reason. SAFU Fund: “SAFU, the Secure Asset Fund ... Binance hacked: More than $40 million stolen in ‘large-scale security breach’ Maltese cryptocurrency exchange Binance has been hacked, with more than $40 million being stolen from hot wallet addresses However, there’s an ongoing Bitcoin wallet hack that regulators can’t do a darn thing about that has since stolen a total of $22 million in BTC and the number climbs with each passing day and unsuspecting user. Here’s what the hack entails, how to avoid it, and why it’s been so successful at stealing cryptocurrency for so long. …phone scam to convince people to pay money into bitcoin ATM, they pretend your social security ID has been stolen and used in crime and that you need to secure your money to prevent it being stolen. Get you to go your bank, take out all your money and then direct you to nearest bitcoin ATM and pay in all your cash. – June 26, 2020 7000 Bitcoins von Kryptogeldbörse Binance gestohlen Über kompromittierte Nutzeraccounts bei der Kryptogeld-Börse Binance sollen Unbekannte Bitcoin im Wert von rund 36 Millionen Euro geklaut haben. Hackers stole 7,000 bitcoin from major cryptocurrency exchange Binance, the platform said. They used a variety of methods to carry out the “large scale security breach," according to the exchange. Cryptocurrency exchange Binance lost $41 million after attackers compromised its “hot wallet” to grab more than 7000 bitcoin. On Tuesday, May 7, Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency ... Binance, one of the world’s biggest cryptocurrency exchanges by trading volume, says that it has suffered a security breach that saw hackers steal more than $40 million worth of Bitcoin. A statement issued by the company says that it discovered the... #Binance #Bitcoin #cryptocurrencyexchange The Binance exchange, which stores Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies for members, said hackers took 7,000 bitcoins in one go. Withdrawals have now been suspended on the platform.
Binance Hacked - What You Need to Know About Holding Your Cryptocurrencies on Centralized Exchanges
The hackers used several different approaches from phishing to viruses to breach Binance security. Hackers stole 7000 Bitcoins, and the transaction code is here so you can follow the movement of ... *MUST WATCH* 40 BTC Stolen Binance Phishing Scam Twitter Scam Warnings Protect Yourself CryptoJack. Loading... Unsubscribe from CryptoJack? Cancel Unsubscribe. Working... Subscribe Subscribed ... Just announced, Binance was hacked today, 7000 BTC stolen, which is around $40 mil. Earlier today CZ tweeted: "Have to perform some unscheduled server maintenance that will impact deposits and ... I’m not sure if calling this a hack is appropriate or even correct, which is why I have gone with a factual episode title. We won’t know the full story until they complete the security audit ... LIVE BITCOIN ANALYSIS - Plus ETH and LTC - Also Any chart Any Market Jim of All Trades 105 watching Live now Mix Play all Mix - Crypto India I क्रिप्टो इंडिया YouTube *MUST WATCH* 40 BTC Stolen Binance Phishing Scam ... How To Make A Bitcoin Wallet Offline - Cold Storage Safe, Secure, Fast AND EASY! - Duration: 7:59. MunkeySpaz 3,954 views. 7:59. How Your Data ... Binance: https://www.binance.com/?ref=11069112 Bitcoin News Today: Binance was hacked for 7,000 BTC today. Are Binance funds SAFU? There was an unplanned Bin...